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ABSTRACT
The nexus between terrorism and narcotics is historically well documented. However, its
contemporary development is rarely brought to light. Rather, narcoterrorism is often considered
to be an outdated phenomenon and characteristic of only Latin America. Nevertheless,
narcoterrorism continues to be a global security concern. As terrorism has evolved over the
recent decade, terrorist relations to the narcotic industry have also evolved. Understanding the
unique characteristics of contemporary narcoterrorism is important to effectively combating both
terrorism and narcotics globally.
The intent of this thesis is to comparatively analyze the differences between traditional
and contemporary terrorist organizations, and how these differences will affect the international
nexus between the narcotic industry and terrorist organizations. The presented research supports
the argument of an increasingly strong connection between contemporary terrorist organizations
and the contemporary narcotic industry. Case study examples will give testimony to the
historically significant and negative effects of narcoterrorism and illustrate the future of
narcoterrorism. The overall objective of this research project is to raise awareness of the role of
contemporary narcoterrorism and to promote greater acknowledgement of its potential
consequences.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Thesis
In this research study, I will analyze the potential of narcoterrorism in contemporary
times, in comparison to the narcoterrorism of the past. I will contend that contemporary terrorist
organizations have a greater financial need than traditional terrorist organizations, due
developmental changes within the organizational structure, terrorist’s targets and methods of
terror that have effected the overall operational cost of terrorist organizations. Additionally, I
will argue that the narcotic industry offers specific advantages to terrorist organizations that
other financing methods do not. Consequently, my overall argument is that contemporary
terrorist organizations will benefit exponentially more from the narcotic industry than traditional
organizations have benefited historically. The presented case studies and analysis will illustrate
that narcoterrorism is a phenomenon that can be predicted to grow in contemporary times due to
the financial need of contemporary terrorist organizations and the steady, global role of the
narcotic industry.
Hypothesis
My research consists of two-correlated hypothesis. Firstly, I will be comparatively
researching how terrorist organizations have evolved, specifically focused on three
characteristics: organizational structure, terrorist targets, and methods of terror. I will then
analyze how these characteristics influence the operational cost of terrorist organizations. Hence,
my first hypothesis will argue that contemporary terrorist organizations have a higher operational
cost than traditional terrorist organizations. With this difference in mind, my second hypothesis
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will argue that the increased operational cost of contemporary terrorist organizations, in
correlation with the advantages of a financial relationship with the expanding contemporary
narcotic industry, increases the potential of contemporary narcoterrorism.
Variables
Since my research consists of two hypotheses, there are, consequently, two sets of
variables. The independent variables, for my first hypothesis are the evolutionary factors of
terrorist organizations: organizational structure, terrorist targets, and methods of terror.
The independent variable, organizational structure, can either emphasize vertical or
horizontal organization, and is respectively traditional or contemporary. The independent
variable, terrorist targets, is either specific or non-specific, and is respectively traditional or
contemporary. The independent variable, methods of terror, is either simple or complex, and is
respectively traditional or contemporary.
This research study argues that these aforementioned independent variables cumulatively
influence the dependent variable of my first hypothesis, operational cost. Organizational
structure directly influences the financial fluidity of operational cost. Vertical organizational
structures are more financially restricted through chain of command, whereas horizontal
organizational structures are less likely to be financially restricted due to less leadership
oversight. Horizontal organizations are so spread out into small units or cells that must conduct
their own financial enterprises; hence, horizontal organizations generally spend more money on
operations because their finances are less regulated or monitored.
Terrorist targets directly influence the cost of men related to operational cost. Specific
terrorists targets are defined as targets with clearly defined parameters, such as ethnicity,
2

political beliefs, religious beliefs, etc. On the other hand, non-specific or indiscriminate terrorist
targets are targets that are not clearly defined, allowing the terrorist organization to persecute
without legitimatized reason. There is lower toll on manpower related to specific targets because
specific targets suggest a clear (generally bi-lateral) opposition between two forces. Whereas
indiscriminate targets can elicit a much higher toll on manpower due to the greater parameters of
the “opposition.” In other words, the larger the scope of terrorists’ targets, the greater the need
for and cost of manpower. Consequently, contemporary terrorist organizations have a higher
operational cost due to their indiscriminate terrorists’ targets that elicit a higher cost of
manpower.
Finally, methods of terror directly influence the cost of intelligence related to operational
cost. Traditional methods of terror include: kidnappings, extortion, assassinations, hijackings,
and suicide bombings. The commonality between all of these individual methods of terror is that
they are all relatively short-term operations; hence, the cost of intelligence is lower.
Contemporary methods of terror, on the other hand, include: international operations and
interest in acquiring advanced weapon technologies. These methods are long-term operations;
hence, their cost of intelligence is comparatively higher.
The dependent variable, operational cost, is the level of a terrorist organization’s cost
with regards to monetary cost, cost of manpower, and cost of time. In other words, operational
cost is a formula composed of money, men and intelligence. Operational cost can either be lower
or higher, and is respectively traditional or contemporary.
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In my second hypothesis, operational cost is my independent variable, while the appeal
of narcoterrorism as a method of financing is my dependent variable. The higher the operational
cost, the most appealing narcoterrorism seems to terrorist organizations.
For the sake of full disclosure, it is important to note that these variables and their
definitions are my own for the purpose of this research paper. However, they are composed of
the information gathered from a multitude of sources that will be cited throughout the research
paper.
Relationship
The characteristics of terrorist organizations- organizational structure, terrorist targets,
and methods of terror- cumulatively influence their operational cost. I argue that 1) the evolution
from vertical and horizontal organizational structures increases the monetary costs related to
operational cost, 2) the evolution from specific and non-specific terrorist targets increase the cost
of men related to operational cost, 3) the evolution within methods of terror increases the cost of
intelligence related to operational cost.
Cumulatively, organizational structure, terrorist’s targets, and methods of terror increase
the overall operational cost of terrorist organizations. Hence, these relationships illustrate a
strong positive correlation between the first set of independent and dependent variables.
Finally, the research study will illustrate how a higher cost of operations leads to a
potential increase in contemporary narcoterrorism, due to the mutual benefits that the
contemporary narcotic industry can offer contemporary terrorist organizations. This will also
illustrate a positive correlation between the second set of variables.
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Significance
Narcoterrorism has had a prosperous past, funding and advancing the objectives of
several traditional organizations. However, the term and definition of narcoterrorism is not
unilaterally agreed upon. Narcoterrorism has been used to label the use of terrorist tactics by
drug lords, in order to advance their criminal activities, and has also been used to label terrorists’
profiting financially from a relationship with the narcotic industry.1 This research study applies
both definitions and investigates how traditional and contemporary terrorist organizations have
cooperated with the narcotic industry for financial and other benefits. Regardless, the
relationship between the narcotic industry and terrorist organizations is mutually beneficial and
for this reason is a serious concern for both counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism. The
characteristics of contemporary terrorist organizations only encourage greater participation in
narcoterrorism, and hence can be predicted to only further develop as a contemporary
phenomenon.
Theoretical Importance
The narcotic industry has historically proved itself to be an accelerating factor of
terrorism. Not only does the narcotic industry establish an ideal recruitment environment for
terrorist organizations, but they enable terrorist objectives through financing.2 Terrorist financing
is a serious security threat because the greater a terrorist organizations’ revenue, the greater their
propensity for violence. Terrorist organization’s activities are highly contingent on their level of
financial support. Recruitment, training, equipment, transportation, are only a few of the
expenses that terrorist organizations face in order to remain operational. Terrorist organizations
have always relied on some level of funding; however, the necessary level of financial support is
5

only increasing. Whereas traditional terrorist organizations’ expenditures were relatively low
because of their unique characteristics of structure, targets, and methods; contemporary terrorist
organizations’ expenditures are comparatively high due to the same aforementioned
characteristics.3
Policy Importance
The inextricable links between narcotics and terrorism are of significant policy
importance. Today, counter-terrorism is given greater priority over counter-narcotics; however,
this research study argues that in the context of narcoterrorism, these counter-strategies are
synonymous and of equal priority. Due to the potential future of contemporary narcoterrorism,
policy awareness and action on this nexus of narcotics and terrorism is imperative. Without due
policy action, the consequences of narcoterrorism will, without a doubt, negatively affect the
U.S. and global security.
Literature Review
The global, illegal economy is the lifeline of terrorist organizations; and one of the
significant illegal commodities is the narcotic industry. With low investment and production
costs in comparison to high demand and market value, narcotics quickly caught the eye of
terrorist organizations.4 Although the concept of narcoterrorism traditionally had been
considered to be a phenomenon unique to Latin America, the narco-terrorist relationship is a
global network, with significant activity in Central and Southeast Asia. Additionally, the
definition of narco-terrorism has developed across time. Originally narcoterrorism was used to
describe the use of violent terrorist acts by drug traffickers and cartels. However, with the rise of
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terrorism, emphasis developed on terrorists’ use of the narcotic industry. The United States Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) dictated their definition of narcoterrorism as the involvement of
terrorist organizations in the narcotic industry as a means of funding, or advancing, their terrorist
objectives.5 The term narcoterrorism, within this study, applies the second, terrorist-focused
definition. Ehrenfeld emphasizes that the narcotic industry not only provides funds to terrorist
organizations, but also undermines the security and stability of countries and an environment for
recruitment. She, also, argues that the narcotic-terrorism nexus is a global security concern that is
not limited to a handful of terrorist organizations, but a majority of them. Ehrenfeld points to the
destabilized countries of Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Afghanistan, Myanmar (all countries with a
significant narcotic industry and political violence), as the poster children for the consequences
of the narcoterrorist relationship.
Turning to the developments of terrorism over time, it becomes clear that terrorist
organizations have evolved from traditional to modern definitions. The evolution includes
differences in the structure, purpose, targets, and methods of terrorist organizations, just to name
a few.6 The differences between traditional and contemporary terrorist organizations are directly
correlated with the activities of the respective organizations, argues Neumann. Furthermore, he
argues that it is imperative to understand how the evolution of terrorism will impact the role of
terrorism in the world. The purpose of this research is to compare the relationships of the
narcotic industry with traditional and contemporary terrorist organizations, respectively, in order
to determine the developing role of contemporary narcoterrorism.
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2002-2007
Abundant literature has been dedicated to the dealings between traditional terrorist
organizations and the narcotic industry. A Library of Congress report in 2002 put together an
extensive analysis of narcoterrorist relations, across countries of Latin America, Southern
Europe, the Middle East, and Central and East Asia.7 The report, like others within the literature,
focuses on the strategic objectives of respective terrorist organizations and the manner in which
they are involved with the narcotic industry. Curtis attributes the fall of the Soviet Union and
state-sponsored terrorism to the rise of narcoterrorism. He also highlights the various narcotic
industries historically related to terrorist organizations, including the cocaine and opium
industry. Additionally, he presents substantial evidence illustrating global narcoterrorist
relations. Most importantly, Curtis specifically details how individual terrorist organizations are
involved with narcotics, which vary from taxing to directly producing narcotic products.
Two major, recognized narco-terrorist relationships within related literature, which will
be used as case study examples of traditional narcoterrorism, are in Colombia and Afghanistan,
respectively. Cecilia Menjívar and Nestor Rodriguez provide detailed analysis on the
narcoterrorist relationships within Colombia. They illustrate the dynamics of Colombia’s narcoterrorist activities and the various objectives and roles of the country’s narco-terrorist
organizations.8 The terrorist connections to Afghanistan’s opium trade are well explained by
David MacDonald. He presents extensive information on the history of Afghanistan’s opium
industry and how terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban, grew to associate and benefit from
the industry.9
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2008-2016
In additional to significant literature on traditional narcoterrorism, there is an abundance
of literature on the topic of terrorist financing. The financing of terrorist organizations is crucial
to the operations of any organizations and is acquired through various methods. These methods
include foreign support, charity donation, extortion, money laundering, smuggling, and
trafficking, to name only a few.10 Drug trafficking is one of the terrorist sources of revenue that
Clarke recognizes. In addition to identifying and explaining various methods of terrorist
financing, he also relates funding to the operational competence of terrorist organizations.
Ridley, also, emphasizes operational competence by identifying the numerous
capabilities that terrorist organizations require to function, including training, recruitment,
intelligence, etc. Ridley argues that focusing on the sources of terrorist financing is imperative to
limiting the power of terrorist organizations.11 In agreement, Jimmy Gurulé provides extensive
examples of terrorists reliance on funding, and what the money goes towards. He, like Ridley,
proposes greater strategic, policy action against various areas of terrorist financing, including the
narcotic industry.12
My Research Topic
Although the topic of narcoterrorism is well recognized within the discipline of terrorism
studies, it is a relationship that is mentioned and then forgotten in today’s world. Terrorism has
overshadowed narcotics as a security threat; however, this topic will reemphasize the
interconnectedness of both and the growing potential narcoterrorism holds in contemporary
times.
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The Literature Gap
Through this research I resolve to fill the literature gap on the topic of contemporary
narcoterrorism that is lacking in present literature. The research will incorporate literature on the
traditional background of narcoterrorism as a comparative foundation, analyzing the differences
between traditional and contemporary terrorist organizations. After illustrating the strength of
traditional narcoterrorism, the study will analyze how the differences of the contemporary
terrorist would affect this narco-relationship. To solidify its role as contemporary literature, the
research will emphasize the greater potential of contemporary narcoterrorism in comparison to
traditional narcoterrorism. The research will serve as an academic caveat of the future of
narcoterrorism and a call for present-day policy action.
My Research Design
To determine the role of contemporary narcoterrorism, I will present past, traditional
narcoterrorist relations and compare the characteristics of traditional and contemporary terrorist
organizations. In order to do so, I have chosen three related case studies, which I will identify
subsequently. After identifying the differences within my chosen characteristics of terrorist
organizations (organizational structure, terrorist targets, methods of terror and operational
cost), I will analyze how the characteristics unique to contemporary terrorist organizations will
influence the contemporary role of contemporary terrorism.
My first two case studies will present the traditional narcoterrorist relations within
Colombia and Afghanistan. Each of these regions has historically held strong narcoterrorist
activity. Both case studies will emphasize the traditional characteristics of the chosen terrorist
organizations within the region. Additionally, the case studies will illustrate how the
10

characteristics of terrorism influence terrorists’ cost of sustainability. My final case study will
introduce the unique characteristics of contemporary terrorism, through the example of a
relevant, and contemporary terrorist organization. Additionally, the final case study will present
the current standing of the international narcotic industry, and the advantages of narcotic industry
that would significantly benefit contemporary terrorists. The overall construct of research design
will provide evidence and analysis that support my thesis, advocating the growing potential of
narcoterrorism in modern times.

Traditional Narcoterrorism in Latin America
Since the 1980s, Colombia has typically held the role of the world’s largest producer of
cocaine, producing about 70-80% of the global cocaine market annually. Colombia’s strong
narcotic industry has been sustained by various terrorist organizations, ranging from guerrilla
groups to paramilitaries. This case study focuses on the traditional terrorist organization, las
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), and its relations with Colombia’s cocaine industry.
An alleged 70% of the AUC’s funding came from narcotics.13 The relationship between the AUC
and Colombia’s cocaine industry demonstrates a traditional narcoterrorist relationship.

Traditional Narcoterrorism in the Middle East
To reinforce the model of traditional narcoterrorism, the study turns to another case study
example: The Taliban’s connections to Afghanistan’s thriving opium industry. Afghanistan
produces over two thirds of the global opium industry. The expansive success of Afghanistan’s
opium industry can be attributed to the Taliban regime. Founded in 1996, the Taliban was an
oppressive religious regime, which received about 70% of its funding from the opium industry.14
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Like the AUC, the Taliban’s narcoterrorism is a strong example of how successful relationships
between terrorist organizations and the narcotic industry have been.

Contemporary Terrorism and the Future of Narcoterrorism
The final, comparative case study is an example of contemporary terrorism and its unique
characteristics provide the foundation for the research thesis. I choose the Islamic State because
of its relevance today, and because it illustrates the characteristics of contemporary terrorism.
The Islamic State’s characteristics differences are what classify them as a model of
contemporary terrorism. These characteristics only increase the profitable potential between
contemporary terrorists and the narcotic industry. Additionally, the narcotic industry is one of the
most beneficial options available to terrorist organizations today, such as IS. Hence, my research
thesis prudently predicts that narcoterrorism will significantly increase in the developing future
of contemporary terrorism.
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CHAPTER 2: TRADITIONAL NARCOTERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA
For the first case study example of the traditional narco-terrorist relationship, this
research study will focus on a country with a narco-economy that has directly influenced the
United States. The unsurpassed, global leader of cocaine production and historically tormented
by political violence, Latin America’s Colombia offers prime examples of the traditional narcoterrorist relationship.
Although Colombia also produces and traffics marijuana, opium and heroin, cocaine is by
far Colombia’s drug of choice. The prevalence and influence of the cocaine industry on
Colombia’s political, economic and social structures will be detailed throughout this case study.
In addition to a rampant narcotic economy, Colombia has also been home to various traditional
terrorist organizations, including paramilitaries and guerilla groups. However, this case study
will focus on one of Colombia’s most infamous paramilitary organizations. Paramilitaries are
armed militias (acting as an unofficial apparatus of a state actor) that typically carry out acts of
terror under the state’s political agenda. Colombia’s paramilitaries are especially known for their
involvement with the country’s drug trade.15 The paramilitary history of Colombia will be
discussed further in a following section.
This example of the nexus between drugs and terror in our own “backyard” of Latin
America will support the overall goal of establishing the background of traditional narcoterrorism. The history of Colombia’s violent paramilitaries, in league with the cocaine industry,
will illustrate the influence of narco-terrorism on political, economic and social structures.
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Specifically, this case study will focus on the relationship between the cocaine industry
and Colombia’s United Self-Defense Forces (Las Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia- AUC).
The purpose of the case study is to present the multi-faceted aspects of traditional narcoterrorism, and thus contribute to predicting the potential of contemporary narcoterrorism.
Colombia’s Narcotic Industry
The development of Colombia’s prevalent cocaine industry has significantly influenced
the country’s social, economic and political structures. Moreover, Colombia’s narco-economy
has held significant consequences on the global cocaine market and on the presence of narcotic
addiction and violence in the Western Hemisphere, especially in the United States. In a country
with a population of about 44 million, about 2 million Colombians have left since 1985 due to
the instability and violence augmented by the narco-economy.16 In March of 1984, the severity
of the Colombian nexus between drugs and terror made national headlines when the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) executed a world record bust of 13.8 tons of cocaine (street value of
1.2 million) at a cocaine lab fortified by military-like equipment and structures. 17 It became
unequivocally clear to the international community that Colombia’s narcotic industry was being
fostered by organizations other than local street gangs.
Historically, the Andean region (including Colombia) has nurtured the cultivation and use
of coca in everyday life for over four thousand years. Indigenous tribes especially cultivated coca
leaves as a nutritional supplement to their basic diets, as well an appetite suppressant. The use of
coca leaves was documented as early as the mid 16th century by the Spanish conquistador Pedro
Cieza de Leon. Coca was such an established commodity by the colonial era that it was even
used as a form of currency.18
14

The resilient coca plant thrives across the various altitudes and climates of Colombia,
growing in mountainous areas and poor soil that otherwise could not be used for food crops.
Additionally, the coca plant is uniquely less susceptible to common parasites and diseases. Coca
cultivation is rather labor-intensive, in terms of time; however, its cultivation requires only basic
equipment and elementary labor skills. Coca crops can yield anywhere from 2 to 6 harvests a
year, making it a fruitful opportunity for rural farmers. Historically, coca crops have been an
appealing “cash crop” and labor source in rural areas of Colombia, where unemployment levels
are highest. Lastly, the manual labor skills required in the production of coca into coca paste or
cocaine are also relatively minimal. After production, this high value, low-weight commodity is
easy to transport and distribute.19
The “cocaine decade” of Colombia began to surge in the mid 1970s, following an
increase in U.S. demand for cocaine products. About 80 percent of Colombia’s cocaine exports
were run through cartels in Medellin and Cali whose revenue was around $6 billion annually by
the 1980s.20 Colombian drug cartels were rarely involved with the cultivation or manufacture of
coca; however, their role in improving the distribution of the illicit product was not insignificant.
By 1987, Colombia produced 11% of the global cocaine products and the drug industry had
boosted the national GDP by 7-10 %.21
The boom of the Colombian cocaine industry can be largely attributed to their
competitive advantage geographically speaking. In comparison with Latin America’s other cocaproducing countries, such as Peru and Bolivia, Colombia enjoys a proximate geographical
location that allows both narcotic transit relationships with Mexico and the Caribbean area. The
value of cocaine exponentially increases through these transit routes from Colombia to the U.S.
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(majority consumer) and Europe. Coca cultivation acreage was estimated at about 51,000
hectares around the mid 1970s; however, in 2001 the United Nations Drug Control Program
estimated that over 400,000 hectares were now used to cultivate coca.22 At the height of its
success in the late 1990s, Colombia’s narcotic industry provided 80% of the world’s cocaine.23
The economic role of the cocaine industry created a “narco-bourgeoisie” in Colombia
that claimed about 40% of the total wealth of all Colombians. These drug lords significantly
affected the country’s social and political structures.24 For example, the Medellin cartel used
some of their narco-funds to promote public goods and services in Colombia, promoting strong
justification for their socio-political involvement.25 The words of former Peruvian president,
Alan Garcia, echo the sentiments of many: “The only successful transnational enterprise
originating in our countries is narcotics trafficking. The most successful effort to achieve Andean
integration has been made by the drug traffickers”.26
The economic prowess of Colombia’s “narcos” attracted investment (especially in
agriculture), boosted the Colombian standard of living and lowered the national levels of
unemployment. However, the narcotic industry of Colombia also exacerbated political corruption
and violence that inherently undermined human rights. Colombians felt extremely divided on the
role of drug trafficking, which brought them economic benefits but restricted their social and
political rights.27 For example, when Colombian President Belisario Betancur implemented a
state of siege so that drug traffickers could be tried in military court without bail (due to a recent
political assassination of Colombia’s minister of Justice), the drug lords declared they would
“close down 1800 businesses and arm a terrorist force of 18,000 against the government.” The

16

political and economic power of the drug lords in Colombia made implementing legitimate
government rule ineffective at best.28
Overall, the cocaine industry has significantly infiltrated the economic, social and
political structures of Colombia. However, Colombia’s cocaine industry must be studied in
tandem with its history of paramilitary organizations, which greatly coincides with the growth of
Colombia’s narcotic industry.
Colombia’s Paramilitary History
One of the innovative forces behind the growth of Colombia’s cocaine industry was the
state’s “unofficial” use of paramilitary forces. Colombia’s United Self-Defense Forces
(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia- AUC) is only one of the paramilitaries that thrived in
Colombia; however, the AUC will be the primary focus of this case study.
To begin with, paramilitaries are military, political machines that are typically operating
under the direction of state-authorized sanctions. Although they are “officially” separate from the
state, they benefit off the resources and support of the state. The purpose of paramilitaries was to
protect the state against any possible threat in a manner that the state cannot legitimately
condone; hence they are more offensive in nature, than defensive.29
The paramilitaries of Colombia grew from a 1965 law that legitimized the assembly of
civilian militias. “All Colombians, men and women not involved in the call to compulsory
military service, may be used by the Government in acts and works contributing to the
reestablishment of normality”.30 These civil-defense militias were legalized with purpose of
aiding the state in their counter-insurgency efforts against Colombia’s leftist guerilla
organizations, such as FARC and the ELN.31 The strategy of legalizing paramilitaries was part of
17

Plan Lazo, a joint military project by the U.S. and Colombian government, which targeted leftist
guerillas and areas supportive of Communist ideologies.32 However, in the late 1980s these
paramilitaries began to grow increasingly violent and associated with drug trafficking. In 1989,
paramilitary groups were deemed illegal. Regardless of Colombia’s new “official” ban on
paramilitaries, paramilitaries continued to assemble and fight against the leftist guerillas.
Landowners, cattle-ranchers, miners, agricultural business owners, and even drug-lords led the
“second wave” of Colombian paramilitaries. The paramilitaries continued to provide the
Colombian administration with intelligence and military-like support.33 The distinction between
paramilitary groups and the state’s military was different in name only.
The unmistakable rise of Colombian paramilitary groups began in in the late 1980-1990s,
due to an increase in leftist guerilla violence across the country. Over one hundred right-wing,
paramilitary groups assembled and joined the efforts of the state in eradicating left-wing, guerilla
organizations. Colombia’s paramilitaries were characterized by their strict, political objectives in
targeting anyone who was thought to be associated or sympathetic to the guerilla cause. The
paramilitaries were well trained and equipped and executed highly effective, military style
attacks against their targets.34
Through the paramilitary strategy, the state is able to conceal the level of their
responsibility of certain events by delineating their political targets to paramilitaries.35 The
Colombian government was able to ‘evade responsibility for crimes by entrusting much of the
dirty work to armed civilian group,’ hence, the political violence of the paramilitaries could not
‘be attributed to persons on behalf of the state because they have been delegated, passed along or
projected upon confused bodies of armed citizens’.36 Additionally, the 2002 World Report by
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Human Rights Watch, documented the relationship between Colombia’s military and the AUC
paramilitary. The AUC would exchange civilian corpses for weapons, and the army would then
claim the bodies as guerrillas who had been killed in action. Other reports affirm the exchange of
intelligence and supplies between the government and paramilitary organizations.37
Unfortunately, however, this relationship only encouraged political violence and human rights
violations.
Paramilitary groups’ social targets fell under the general category of anyone who was
associated or allegedly supportive of leftist and other anti-state ideologies. These targets
included: women, youth, journalists, students, human rights activists, indigenous tribes, and trade
unions. Not only were the Colombian paramilitary targets unnecessarily broad but also the
paramilitaries were characterized by brutal methods of torture and slaughter. It is estimated that
paramilitaries conducted over 1,000 massacres that left about 8,500 people dead from 19932006. Paramilitary cultivated a culture of fear through public mutilation, rape and other methods
leading to extremely painful deaths. Furthermore, paramilitaries would also sometimes hide the
bodies of their victims to avoid murder convictions and add to the culture of fear. This led to
crematoriums where paramilitaries burned over 200 victims between 2001-2003. The brutality of
the paramilitaries was responsible for 46% of all internal displacement in Colombia, compared to
12% by the guerilla groups.38 Official studies estimate that about 1.4 million Colombians were
internally displaced within the borders of Colombia by 1999.39
Moreover, paramilitaries held a strong presence in Colombia’s political structures. The
“paramilitary elite” often financed the campaigns of pro-paramilitary candidates, harassed
opposing candidates and pressured citizens to vote for pro-military candidates. Through these
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tactics, the paramilitary were able to evade political oversight and run their illegal operations and
financial enterprises smoothly. It is estimated that 77% of elected officials in Colombia’s
Congress from 2002-2006 were directly linked to paramilitaries.40 In 2008, paramilitary leader
Salvatore Mancuso was extradited to the U.S. on drug trafficking charges and in what was
named the “Parapolitica scandal” testified to the names of about 100 politicians in Colombia
with paramilitary ties.41
One of the more prominent paramilitary networks, was Colombia’s United Self-Defense
Forces, the AUC. The AUC was officially formed in 1997 under the leadership of Carlos
Castaño, a significant figure of authority in Colombia’s paramilitary history. Although the AUC
was formally named in the late 1990s, it was a conglomerate of several precursor paramilitary
organizations, which aligned their efforts against the leftist guerilla groups.42 Under Castaño’s
strict organizational structure, the AUC grew into the state’s most powerful, armed political
machine. The centrality of the organization and the enforced chain of command allowed the
AUC to incorporate most, if not all, of Colombia’s political paramilitaries under its umbrella.43
By 2002, the AUC was estimated at 15,000 members and established a well-armed
presence across over 40% of Colombian municipalities. The AUC considered themselves to be
patriots saving their country from the corruption of leftist groups. An excerpt from a 2003
Colombian letter reads, “The historic military role assumed by the self-defense forces has been a
necessary and determinant factor that has allowed Colombia to sustain its fragile and threatened
democracy…in the context of the indecision and incongruence of the political system”.44
As a result of the aforementioned human rights violations, the U.S. Department of State
placed the AUC on its official list of terrorist organizations in 2001.45 In response to international
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criticism of the AUC’s brutal human rights violations, Carlos Castaño stated that the AUC would
no longer commit massacres. However, research suggests that the AUC continued to kill noncombatants and suspected guerrillas in mass and then disperse or hide the bodies to avoid the
public’s attention.46
The socio-economic role of the AUC was most obvious through its role in the illegal
economy, more specifically the narcotic industry, of Colombia. This financial relationship is the
focus of this case study and will be presented in depth in its own respective and following
section. However, the socio-political role of the AUC was significant in its own respect. Because
the AUC became the all-encompassing paramilitary of the state, the organization itself was a
noteworthy political actor. The AUC controlled a large majority of regions across Colombia and
had representatives supporting them at both local and state levels of political infrastructure.
Although Colombia boasts of its democratic elections and relative lack of military coups, it
clearly has had more than its fair share of political violence. Political conflict in Colombia has
typically been resolved through armed engagement; consequently, paramilitaries were
considered to be convenient and profitable for the state.47
The AUC was officially demobilized under Colombian president, Alvaro Uribe, in 2002.
The AUC declared a cease-fire with the Colombian government and from there began peacetalks. However, the political violence related with the AUC did not immediately dissipate, as the
AUC did not declare a cease-fire with leftist organizations. Over the course of the next few
years, the AUC was slowly disassembled. By 2006, the AUC was no longer the paramilitary
umbrella of Colombia.48
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Overall, the AUC illustrates the characteristics of a traditional terrorist organization:
vertical chain of command (under Castaño), “defined” political targets, and low-levels methods
of terror (in terms of intelligence necessary). The capabilities of the AUC as a terrorist
organization were significantly associated with and funded by Colombia’s cocaine industry,
which significantly contributed to the longevity of the paramilitary’s power.
Colombia’s Narco-Terrorism
In Colombia, drug violence and political violence were essentially synonymous. The
close relationship between the Colombian cocaine industry and Colombian paramilitary groups
such as the AUC encouraged violence. The narcoterrorist is a terrorist unit that significantly
exploits the financial profits of the narcotic industry as a means of funding their objectives, etc.
The existence of the Colombian narcoterrorist is indisputably supported through evidence that
will be subsequently presented, including the strength of the relationship, and the consequences
of the relationship.
At the very beginning of the AUC, their leader Carlos Castaño attempted to insulate the
paramilitary from the cocaine industry of Colombia. Castaño declared that any individual
associated with the paramilitary would be severely punished for any involvement in the drug
trade.49 Castaño is quoted with saying, ‘With respect to narco-trafficking, our organization has
been clear…those members who commit such crimes will have to respond to the Colombian or
foreign courts and in no moment may their personal activity involve the organization, which
does not participate in this type of business’.50 It is thought that Castaño originally held these
anti-narcotic sentiments due to his campesino Catholic upbringing. However, Castaño’s
sentiments eventually changed as the AUC expanded and required increasing funding. He began
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by permitting the taxation of cocaine exports, which collected about two to three hundred pesos a
month. Guerilla groups, such as FARC, also used this method of coca taxation. By 1997, Castaño
had begun overtly funding the AUC through coca taxation. That same year, Castaño met with the
leading cocaleros (cocaine producers/distributors) in Colombia and offered them better
protection against the guerillas in return for half of the taxes the guerillas were asking the
cocaleros for. A major massacre soon after this offer, the Mapiripán massacre, bore witness to
the results of the meeting.51 A five-day massacre, the AUC brutally murdered and tortured over
30 residents of a small town named Mapiripán, throwing them into the river. The incident
illustrated the relationship between the AUC and the cocaine industry, but also its relationship
with the state’s military that feigned ignorance of the massacre.52
In 2002, Castaño publically acknowledged the role of the cocaine industry in the AUC’s
financial sources. ‘Our declarations that the AUC collects ‘taxes’ on the coca producers should
not be interpreted as evidence of trafficking or exporting of drugs…the drugs on production are
necessary to maintain the fight against the FARC, but are not evidence of personal enrichment’.53
Castaño continued to insist, despite evidence otherwise, that the AUC’s participation in the drug
trade was strictly restricted to fees on the production of coca. In 2001, he reported that the AUC
profited only about $2 million a year in taxes through the coca industry. He continued to
downplay the paramilitary’s association with the illicit drug trade, but evidence was
overwhelmingly against him. It became clear that the AUC was much more involved with the
drug trade by providing security and resources for the manufacturing and transportation of
coca.54 In 1999, a police operation in Colombia uncovered a coca lab under paramilitary control
that produced about 8 tons of cocaine a month. By 2002, Castaño admitted that the AUC’s
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funding was 70% related to Colombia’s cocaine industry. Altogether the combination of drugrelated activities, extorted and voluntary contributions amounted to an official estimate of $200$300 million income per year towards the AUC’s activities.55
Later in 2002, the U.S. attempted to extradite Castaño and another AUC leader, Salvatore
Mancuso, on drug-trafficking charges. Castaño, who considered himself a patriot and continued
to deny direct involvement with the drug industry, was insulted by these charges. Earlier that
year, he had conferred with the AUC and suggested withdrawing the paramilitary’s support to
the drug trade. The other leaders of the AUC refused to do so.56 The lack of control that Castaño
held over the AUC’s relationship with the cocaine industry illustrates the severity of the nexus
between drugs and terror. “It is a seemly inevitable fact that, when terrorist groups pass a certain
state in their development and become successful in financial terms, their high political
principles are compromised.” The AUC is exemplary of this statement. The more funding the
AUC was able to derive from the cocaine industry, the more dependent on the relationship they
became.57 In closing, the inextricably correlation between Colombia’s cocaine industry and the
power of the AUC as a paramilitary illustrates the substantial consequences of the narco-terrorist
relationship.
Colombia and Cocaine Today
After investigating the history of the cocaine industry in Colombia, it is important to also
recognize the role that Colombia’s cocaine industry plays today. According to the 2016
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report on Colombia, cocaine production in 2014 rose
by 30% and 60 metric tons (MT) over the 2013 production levels. This rise is due to a 39%
increase in coca cultivation, which rose from 85,500 hectares (ha) in 2013 to 112,000 hectares in
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2014. In 2014, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration also estimated that about 90 of the
cocaine seized within the United States is of Colombian origin. The dramatic increases in 2014
are attributed to reports that insurgency groups, specifically FARC, encouraged coca farmers to
plant more in anticipation of post peace-talks with the Colombian government that would
potentially then target coca-growing areas. Additionally coca growers have implemented several
counter-eradication techniques that have proven to be much more effective than eradication
techniques. Although Colombia continues to fight the cocaine industry and often works hand in
hand with the U.S. with drug-crime related extradition, Colombia’s cocaine industry continues to
feed the violence and corruption within the country.58
Conclusions
This case study offered an informative background on traditional narcoterrorism in Latin
America, and illustrated the severe consequences of a financial relationship between a traditional
terrorist organization and the narcotic industry. The case study highlighted the characteristics of
the AUC, a traditional terrorist organization: a vertical chain of command, short-term
intelligence operations and specific and regional political targets. Then, the case study portrayed
how the narcoterrorism in Colombia significantly shaped the historical development of the
country. The unofficial partnership between the state and the terrorist paramilitaries, such as the
AUC, corrupted economic and political structures and spread instability. This instability lead to a
lack of trust in government and general unrest, which only perpetuated the presence of the narcoterrorist. The success of the cocaine industry provided substantially for Colombia’s
paramilitaries, expanding their budget, capabilities and political influence. Through political ties
to the state and economic ties to narcotics, paramilitaries, such as the AUC, became a main actor
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in Colombian politics. The evidence provided in the case study illustrates how easily the narcoterrorist gains men, money and momentum. The following case study will further support the
historical background of traditional narcoterrorism.
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CHAPTER 3: TRADITIONAL NARCOTERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
In comparison to Colombia’s AUC, Afghanistan’s Taliban regime illustrates another
example of a traditional terrorist organization significantly associated and involved with the
narcotics industry. In contrast, the Taliban is regionally and ideologically different from the
AUC. However, as a traditional terrorist organization, the Taliban does share some common
characteristics factors) including: organizational structure, terrorist targets, and methods of
terror. This comparison portrays the diversity of traditional narcoterrorist relationships, while
consolidating the consistent characteristics of a traditional narcoterrorist relationship. The
aforementioned factors will be used to illustrate how the narcotic industry affected and benefited
the terrorist organization. Additionally, in the following case study, these factors will lay a
historical foundation for predicting the potential development of contemporary narco-terrorist
relationships.
Over the last 25 years, Afghanistan has developed into the world’s lead producer and
exporter of opium and its derivatives. Similar to Colombia, the opium industry has significantly
affected the economic, political and social development of Afghanistan. This development can
be attributed to the innovative sponsorship of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime during the late
1990s. An authoritarian insurgency, the Taliban was a traditional terrorist organization that
manipulated and benefitted from the profitable financial market of opium.59
Consistent with the previous case study, this case study will present background
knowledge on both Afghanistan’s narcotic industry and Taliban organization and how they
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influenced political, economic and social structures. From there, the narcoterrorism relationship
between the two will be detailed, especially focusing on how the relationship affected the
Taliban’s capabilities, such as weaponry, training, intelligence. The purpose of this case study is
to reinforce the background of traditional narco-terrorism, in order to make an informed
prediction on the likelihood and potential of contemporary narco-terrorism.
Afghanistan’s Narcotic Industry
The development of Afghanistan’s successful opium industry has held significant
consequences on social, economic and political structures. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s growth
into a narco-economy has augmented the detrimental effects of the heroin market in Western
countries, especially Europe, which is Afghanistan’s largest opiate consumer. “The opium
economy- including its nexus with insecurity, warlords, state weakness, and poor governanceconstitutes a central development problem for the country”.60
Opium’s presence in Afghanistan dates back to the time period of Alexander the Great,
however, opium held only a limited role economically until the early 1990s. Around this time,
Afghanistan’s Musahiban government began to capitalize on legal opiate cultivation. This
venture became a profitable source of financial security for the government.61 Additionally, legal
opium production is important for countries’ medical and scientific need for illicit substances,
including morphine, heroin, codeine, and thebaine. The International Narcotics Control Board is
the organization in charge of sanctioning the amount of acreage that can be used for a country’s
legal opium crops. Generally speaking, Turkey and India have been the world’s producers of
legal opiates, however, the disruption of WWII allowed Afghanistan a small foothold into the
narcotic industry.62
28

As the market demand and value for Afghan opiates increased, the Afghan government’s
control over opium cultivation decreased. Illegal opium crops began to appear with much more
frequency. Around the mid-1990s, the U.S. –one of Afghanistan’s main consumers of legal
opiates- began to question the rise of illegal opiate production in Afghanistan. Due to external
market pressures from the U.S. and a need for foreign aid, the Afghan government put forth a
ban against both legal and illegal opium production. However, this ban was anything but
effective.63
Opium cultivation and exportation continued to increase. As a crop, opium is
significantly profitable. It is a hardy, drought resistant plant, easy to maintain in Afghanistan’s
mountainous countryside. Additionally, opiates are relatively lightweight and easy to transport.
Opium was an appealing financial option to rural agricultural areas with little other means of
financial profit.64 During Afghanistan’s political turmoil in the 1970’s (outbreak of civil war),
Afghanistan slowly began to emerge as a principle contributor of the illicit opium industry. This
step into the global narcotic industry has been attributed to Afghanistan’s ‘triple comparative
advantage of favorable physical, political and economic conditions”.65
Opium not only sustained Afghanistan’s need for a valuable economic commodity, but
also the country’s need for wage labor. ‘Drug profits are clearly financing local warlords and the
political elite but also sustain the livelihoods of many quite poor people”.66 In 2002, research
done on the average value of heroin from cultivation/production to distribution corroborates the
unequal distribution of financial profit. The value of one kilogram of heroin ranged from about
$550 at farm-gate value to $175,000 at retail value in Europe.67 A 2005 illegal opium crop in
Afghanistan serves as another supporting example. The farm gate value of the crop was $560
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million, in comparison to the opium traffickers’ revenue of $2.14 billion and the export value of
$2.7 billion.68
Although the rural farmer benefits the least financially (in comparison of monetary
profits), the opium industry is not without significant advantages for the rural farmer. Opium is
traditionally harvested by hand, hence, it is a rather labor intensive commodity. Furthermore, the
opium poppy is an annual crop that must be sown each year. Poppy crops must be
methodologically weeded, and the poppy head must be gathered within a small window of time.
However, these characteristics are not necessarily negative, as they raise the opportunity for
wage labor.69
Furthermore, the necessary skills and tools required for opium cultivation are
respectively, easily acquired and easily manufactured. Opium also serves as a form of insurance
and investment for the rural farmer. Salaam, the system of advanced purchase on opium crops
provides farmers with financial security and investment options. Furthermore, the farmer can use
opium profits to provide insurance against market fluctuations in food crops, such as wheat and
maize.70 By 2003-2004, an estimated 34% of harvested acreage was opium, in comparison with
59% wheat and 7% vegetables/fruit.71
From 1994-2002, Afghanistan produced over 20,000 tons of opium, about 63% of the
world’s opium production. The closest in production rates is Myanmar, at only about 30% of
global opium production. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
Afghanistan’s opium market profited about $150 million a year between 1994-2000. This profit
exponentially increased to about $1200 million in 2002, though this settled down to around $560
in 2005. However, even with this decrease, it was about 52% of Afghanistan’s GDP.72 The
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economic role of the opium industry is enough to consider Afghanistan an established narcoeconomy.
Additionally, the opium industry has held devastating socio-cultural consequence on the
region. One of the most significant social effects is the exponential increase of drug addiction.
The regional drug problem of the Middle Eastern region has dramatically increased, specifically
heroin addiction. Pakistan, a trade route area for the opium industry, had about 20,00 heroin
addicts in 1980. In 2005, the numbers had multiplied about 25 times.73 Iran, the other principle
transit country for opium, is home to about 2 million addicts. In addition to a serious drug
addiction culture, the spread of HIV considerably increased due to heroin needle sharing. These
increasing addiction and health epidemics seriously hamper social development.74
Lastly, the opium industry has a negative impact on the political structures of
Afghanistan. The illegality of the prominent narcotic industry exacerbates the political instability
of the country. The narcotic industry holds concrete ties with Afghan’s violent insurgencies,
hence irking the development of Afghanistan’s government. However, governmental corruption,
the economic importance and general acceptance of opium as a commodity undermine the
regional efforts to reduce the narcotic presence.
In 2006, Afghan President Hamid Karzai called the opium trade, “the single greatest
challenge to long-time security, development and effected governance of Afghanistan.” It is
common knowledge that the narcotic industry has corrupted many state authorities. Local
farmers bribe government officials to turn a blind eye in return for a profit, etc. In fact, it has
been estimated that Afghan government officials were involved in about 70% of narcotic
trafficking. Because prosecuting these offenders can further undermine the outward appearance
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of state, these officials often escape untouched. Additionally, because about half of
Afghanistan’s GDP is related to the narcotic industry, the initiative to eliminate its presence is
rather weak. Moreover, there is a fear of isolating the rural farmer dependent on opium crops,
which might drive them to support anti-government insurgencies.75
Overall, the opium industry has significantly infiltrated the economic, social and political
structures of Afghanistan. The presence of Afghanistan’s drug culture has encouraged an
environment of insecurity, ideal for extremist organizations such as the Taliban.
Afghanistan’s Taliban Regime
An innovative force behind the success of Afghanistan’s opium industry, the Taliban
regime transformed into a military insurgency rooted in both traditional terrorism and the
narcotic industry. The Taliban was originally a religious movement led by Mullah Mohammad
Omar and composed of Islamic students. The name Taliban is derived from the word talib,
meaning “one who seeks knowledge”.76
The Soviets had occupied Afghanistan since 1979 in an attempt to implement a Soviet
Afghan regime. However, after substantial loss of life, Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev,
decided to withdraw his forces in 1989. Gorbachev’s withdrawal of forces resulted in significant
political destabilization as Afghanistan’s warlords, the mujahedeen, struggled to gain power
among themselves.77
The Taliban burst into Afghanistan’s political instability rather unexpectedly. The origins
of the organization are said to stem from an intervention of Omar and 30 “talibs” in 1994, on
behalf of two young girls who had been abducted and abused by a military commander. The
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original group of thirty eventually developed into 30,000-35,000 followers.78 The Taliban grew
to control about 90% of Afghanistan from 1996-2001.79
Omar founded the Taliban on the principle of subduing the violent instability
characteristic of the post-Soviet time period. The Taliban’s principle objectives were to ‘restore
peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law, and defend the integrity and Islamic character
of Afghanistan”.80 The Afghan, tired of the civil war within their borders, welcomed the Taliban
and their promises of peace.81
Additionally, Omar implemented a variety of trade routes for financial reasons that
encouraged economic growth. The Taliban gained substantial popular support, specifically due
to their positive economic influence. Osama bin Laden, the Saudi Arabian terrorist leader, even
sponsored the Taliban. By 1996, the Taliban had gained control over the majority of
Afghanistan. Fundamentalist Islamists attributed the Talibs with restoring Afghanistan to
stability after the post-Soviet chaos.82
However, under the Taliban regime, strict legal codes were enforced, promoting a “pure”
Islamic state of Afghanistan. The Talib’s fundamentalist rule included restricted women’s rights
in education, work, and personal freedoms. Television, non-religious publications,
homosexuality, adultery, were among the severely punishable offenses. The Taliban established
the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice (PVSV), a religious police that
executed extreme punishments ranging from public execution, to amputations, to public
beatings.83
The manner in which the Taliban enforced their fundamental Islamic rule was drastically
different from Afghan social norms, especially in the rural areas of Afghanistan where the
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Taliban was less familiar. The Taliban forcefully implemented ideals of how rural locals should
conduct themselves. Although the Taliban was a strong military regime, they lacked ideological
connections to the majority of Afghanistan.84 The Afghans were left stuck between the Taliban’s
harsh rule of law and economic innovation.
The structural organization of the Taliban was extremely centralized into a vertical chain
of command. Omar was the Supreme Leader (and remained so throughout the existence of the
Taliban), and he and a small group of elders (mullahs) dictated official decisions. The PVSV and
other units of the Talib executed Omar’s decisions indiscriminately. Because of the Taliban’s
violent extremist policies and actions, only three countries gave political recognition to the
Taliban government: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.85
During the Taliban regime, Omar enjoyed a sponsorship and relationship with AlQaeda’s extremist leader, Osama Bin Laden. This relationship brought the Taliban regime under
severe international criticism, as Afghanistan became a haven for Islamic extremists to gather
safely. However, the Taliban and Al Qaeda remained two distinct organizations, due to their very
different ideologies.86
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States, the Taliban
experienced the full force of international criticism for their relations with Bin Laden. Although
the Taliban denied any contribution to the 9/11 attacks, the damage was done. Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates ended their diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, and Pakistan
encouraged the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden to the international community. In 2001, the
U.S. and Great Britain began air strikes against the Taliban and Al Qaeda within Afghanistan.
The Northern Alliance of Afghanistan, Taliban opposition, joined the military campaign against

34

the Taliban. By the end of 2001, the Taliban regime collapsed and Taliban opponent, Hamid
Karzai, took governmental control over Afghanistan.87
However, the Taliban’s fall from power did not spell the end of the Taliban. Rather,
Taliban leaders regrouped (still under the leadership of Omar) and formed a terrorist-like
insurgency rather than a religious regime. The Taliban insurgency devoted their efforts against
the Afghan government, U.S. military forces within Afghanistan, and certain areas of PakistanAfghanistan border. Consequently, the borders of Afghanistan relatively define their terrorist
targets. By 2005, the Taliban, once again, gained international attention for their methods of
terror, including suicide bombs, roadside bombs, political assassinations and kidnappings.88
These methods of terror require relatively short-term intelligence operations in order to carry out
attacks successfully.
Although the argument can be made that the Taliban regime did not constitute a terrorist
organization, the Taliban insurgency that arose after 2001 is, in fact, a terrorist organization. The
Taliban insurgency demonstrates the characteristics of a traditional terrorist organization: vertical
chain of command, specific “defined” targets, and lower-level methods of terror (in terms of
intelligence necessary). Lastly, not only is the Taliban insurgency a terrorist organization, but
they are also an organization deeply entrenched in Afghanistan’s opium industry.
Afghanistan’s Narco-Terrorism
The Taliban began affiliating with Afghanistan’s opium industry from the inception of
the regime and their involvement continued into their transformation into an insurgency. An
estimated 70% of the Taliban’s funding has been related to involvement in the narcotic industry.
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Despite the fact that the Taliban’s religious principles did not condone the use of narcotics, the
organization held no stipulations against profiting off of the drug usage of “infidels”.89
The Taliban regime appeared around the same time as Afghanistan’s opium industry
began to significantly grow, and the regime only aided this growth. By significantly reducing
checkpoints and ending Afghanistan’s civil war, the Taliban greatly facilitated the expansion of
the opium industry. In 1999, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) estimated
that 91,000 hectares were being used for opium cultivation, a staggering difference to the
reported 18,500 hectares estimated in 1987.90
One theory surmises that the Taliban maximized the opium industry in order to capitalize
on the industry. In 2001, the Taliban reduced opium production by 90% with a strictly enforced
ban on the cultivation and production of opium products. It is stipulated that this ban was
actually a financial strategy, as the Taliban cultivated the drastic rise in demand in comparison to
the drop in supply. The value of poppies and opiates multiplied by almost 10 times, and the
Taliban only strictly enforced the ban for about a year’s span. After then, the Taliban’s narcotic
sponsorship grew more and more consistent. Eventually, the Taliban publically portrayed their
involvement in the opium trade as an attempt to protect the livelihood of the common Afghan.
They denounced counter-narcotic strategies as attempts to destabilize the Afghan economy.91
Another theory stipulates that the Taliban regime’s 2001 ban on opium was related to
their desire for international recognition and foreign financial aid. During the Taliban’s regime,
only three countries recognized the regime as a legitimate government, and the majority of the
international community condemned the Taliban’s conduct against social groups, especially
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women. This lack of political recognition led the Taliban to impose the 2001 ban on opium, in
order to illustrate its legitimacy to the international community.92
Regardless of why the Taliban manipulated their association with the narcotic industry,
the capabilities of the Taliban (especially as an insurgency) were markedly developed by the
stability of their financing, of which narcotics was a major contributor. Although narcotics were
by no means the Taliban’s only source of funding, their annual narcotics related income ranged
from $70-500 milion.93 This was hardly an insignificant amount. In 2007, approximately 80% of
opium cultivation occurred in areas controlled by a permanent Taliban insurgency presence. The
Taliban organization assisted ‘smugglers and farmers protect their laboratories, trade opium up
to the border and fight back against anti-drug campaigns”.94 The Taliban’s profits off of the
opium industry are generally related to production and transportation taxes.95 Considering the
high market value of opiates and the role of Afghanistan as the global leader in illegal opiates,
the Taliban insurgency capitalized on the narcotic industry.
Stable income especially sustained the insurgency in three significant areas: weapons,
training, and intelligence. As an insurgency, the Taliban operated much like a guerrilla group,
using sniping, ambushing, and terrorizing techniques. However, they were extremely well armed.
Their extensive weaponry included, but was not limited to: assault rifles, rocket propelled
grenades, and improvised explosive devices. With regards to training, the Taliban militants were
well prepared. According to U.S. Marine’s Corps After Action Reports, Taliban units were well
trained in various strategic tactics such as “fire control, combined arms, anti-armor tactics, cover
and concealment, and defense in depth”.96
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Additionally, the Taliban insurgency enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan, where they built
several impressive training camps. Lastly, the Taliban developed strong intelligence support,
along with collaborations with Pakistani intelligence organizations. Their strong intelligence
force allowed the Taliban to infiltrate large areas of Afghanistan. Each of these capabilities
requires essential funding, and due to the solid development of each, it is clear that the Taliban
was not lacking in funding.97 Drawing a correlation between the high level of narcotic revenue,
and well-developed capabilities, the Taliban’s narcoterrorist relationship was highly effective.
Afghanistan & Opium Today
After investigating the history of the opium industry in Afghanistan, it is important to
also recognize the role of Afghanistan’s opium industry today. According to the 2016
Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the UNODC, opium poppy cultivation has increased.
The area of cultivation is estimated at 201,000 hectares, a 10% increase from the last year’s
estimates. Most of these increases are accounted for in Afghanistan’s northern regions where
insecurity severely diminished eradication attempts. Overall, eradication efforts have decreased
by 91%. The increase in cultivation logistically led to an increase in opiate production. The
potential production of opium is up by 43%, from 3,300 tons in 2015 to 4,800 tons in 2016.98
Clearly, the opium industry continues to hold a significant role in Afghanistan, contributing to
both their GDP and instability.
Conclusions
The previous case studies respectively on Colombia’s AUC and Afghanistan’s Taliban
regime, present an all-encompassing view of the traditional narco-terrorist relationship. With
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state-sponsored narcoterrorism (AUC) on one side and insurgent narcoterrorism (Taliban) on the
other, one can conclude the general characteristics of traditional terrorist organizations. Both
organizations were markedly well armed, trained and informed in comparison their regional
opposition forces. Both organizations are characterized by a vertical chain of command, and
short-term intelligence operations against their specific and regional political targets. From there,
one can investigate the financial relationships that these traditional terrorist organizations
enjoyed with the narcotic industry. In both cases, the AUC and the Taliban insurgency profited
significantly from their narcotic involvement. The advantages of narcoterrorism are some of the
factors that perpetuated the constancy of terrorism in both Colombia and Afghanistan.
Today, however, the contemporary terrorist organization is markedly different. Certain
characteristics, which will be investigated in the following case study, set apart the traditional
and the contemporary terrorist. On the other hand, the narcotic industry is far from diminished
and continues to threaten global security. With this in mind, is the nexus of terrorism and
narcotics still a significant threat or simply a vestige of the past? Obviously the two will always
have some overlap, but will the contemporary terrorist capitalize on the narcotic industry as the
traditional terrorist did before him? And would a contemporary narco-terrorist relationship be
more or less profitable than the narco-terrorism of the past? The following and final case study
will offer an answer to these questions through investigation of both a contemporary terrorist
organization and the role of the global narcotic industry today.
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CHAPTER 4: CONTEMPORARY NARCOTERRORISM AND ITS
FUTURE
The previous case studies in Colombia and Afghanistan offered a comprehensive
background on the traditional narcoterrorist relationship, however, the global nexus between
illicit drugs and terrorist organization is still a security concern today (Meierrieks and Scheneider
2016, 1).99 The global drug industry continues to enable the movements and objectives of
terrorist organizations. However, today the term narco-terrorism is more commonly misused as a
“political slogan” rather than significant security threat. Barry McCaffrey, former Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, made the following comment: “It is possible that the
U.S.’s previous unwillingness to accept the concept of narco-terrorism may be based on a belief
that such acknowledgement would mean a much steeper escalation in the drug war.100 Regardless
of the cause behind the lack of attention to contemporary narcoterrorism, it remains a relevant
security threat today and, as this research study argues, a security threat that will only increase.
In this case study, I will present the components of contemporary narcoterrorism, which
include the global status of the modern drug trade and the relatively new characteristics of
contemporary “new” terrorism. Development within these two components has altered the
strength of the relationship between terrorists and the narcotic industry. The sustained
profitability and expansion of the global drug market in correlation with the characteristics of
contemporary terrorism have significantly augmented the potential strength of the relationship. I
will highlight several variables and how they can be predicted to affect the contemporary narcoterrorist relationship. Additionally, I will present a case study example of a contemporary
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terrorist organization and how its characteristics have and will influence its relationship to the
narcotic industry. The evidence emphasized in this chapter will introduce the importance of
counter-narcotic initiates in counter-terrorism strategies that will be discussed in the research
study’s conclusion.
The Contemporary Drug Trade
The global narcotic industry has always been a successful enterprise and continues to
leave a significant imprint on today’s world. About 5% of the world’s adult population has used
an illicit drug at least once and about .6% are drug addicts.101
A brief analysis of the current global situation related to the international drug trade
reveals the following alarming information. East Africa is rising in its role as a transit region for
Middle Eastern drug organizations. West Africa is a significant source of illicit stimulants
destined for Asia. Central America and the Caribbean continue to be the prominent supplier to
North America and Europe, and these regions have significantly suffered due to the instability
and insecurity of the illicit drug trade. Eastern and South-Eastern Europe hold five times the
average rates of drug abuse by injection. Western and Central Europe’s number of new,
distributed psychoactive substances are growing. South Asia has risen as a major contributor to
illicit manufacturing and trafficking of pharmaceutical narcotics.102 Additionally, U.S. drug
related fatalities have increase significantly since 2008, surpassing both fatalities by vehicles and
firearms.103
Illicit drugs include heroine, cocaine, opium, cannabis, amphetamine-type stimulates
including ecstasy, and more. The illicit drug trade also profits off the illegal distribution of
typical medical prescriptions such as morphine and hydrocodone.104 The two greatest concerns
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related to narcotics currently are an increase in synthetic drugs and a drug prevalence shift from
developed to undeveloped countries.105
Synthetics are generally experimental psychoactive substances. The significant role of
social media in today’s world introduces and markets these new drugs, quickly promoting
production levels. Because the chemical formulas for these synthetic substances change
frequently, distributors profit significantly before any specific counter-narcotic policies are
created. Synthetics are especially a concern among the youth population.106 These synthetics are
created to mimic the effects of reported and controlled drugs. However, these synthetics typically
have higher levels of potency and risks. For example, “Krokodil” a synthetic used as a morphine
substitute has about 10 times the potency of morphine and high levels of chemicals that directly
damages the nervous and muscular systems of the user.107
Furthermore, demographic trends are predicting an increase of the total number of drug
users in developing countries. The increase is correlated to the countries’ higher rates of
population growth, urbanization and youth. This shift is especially concerning as developing
countries are relatively less prepared to counter the narcotic industry.108 While the narcotic
industry has historically operated in developing countries, their consumer markets have generally
been in developed countries, such as the U.S. Now, however, the narcotic industry is opening a
new consumer market in developing countries as well. Socioeconomic factors of these less
developed areas, such as poverty, economic inequality, low employment and educations rates,
directly exacerbate the damaging effect of the drug use. Furthermore, approximately three
quarters of the world’s population has little to no access to controlled medications that could be
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used for drug rehabilitation. The combination of these factors has a notably negative effect on the
global health situation.109
In addition to negative health trends, the international drug trade promotes political
instability and human rights violations by funding and enabling the activities of a variety of
contemporary illegal organizations, including insurgencies, drug cartels, and terrorists. The role
and characteristics of contemporary terrorist organizations will be underlined in the following
section.
Contemporary Terrorism
The global narcotic industry evolved with contemporary times, expanding its reach and
its potency. Contemporary terrorism has done much the same. Although the definition of
terrorism has remained relatively constant, the characteristics of terrorism have changed. The
definition of terrorism used for this research study is the current U.S. Department of Defense
definition: “The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious,
political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit
of goals that are usually political.”110 The evolved characteristics of terrorism that this research
study focuses on are 1) organizational structure 2) terrorist targets 3) methods of terror, and 4)
operational cost. Every terrorist organization is unique; however, contemporary terrorist
organizations can be defined by these aforementioned characteristics.
First of all, organizational structure is one of the most noticeable differences between
traditional and “new” contemporary terrorism. Traditional terrorist groups are characterized by
an emphasis on a vertical, hierarchal chain of command, with clear lines of command and rank.
This conventional network of authority resembles military-type structure and organization.
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Contemporary terrorists, on the other hand, tend to utilize horizontal structures of organization.
This horizontal structure, also called a cell-based network, is composed of a variety of different
teams (“cells”) that operate under the umbrella of a terrorist organization. However, only the
team (“cell”) leader has direct access to the greater network of the organization. In this way,
when terrorist operatives are caught, it is more likely for the related “cell” to be compromised
rather than a large part of the terrorist organization. By implementing horizontal structures, the
organization is less susceptible to infiltration and personal relationships have replaced formal
chains of command within the operative level. While contemporary terrorist organizations by no
means implement horizontal structures exclusively, they certainly utilize horizontal
organizational structures significantly more than traditional terrorist organizations. In the words
of analysts, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, horizontally structured organizations emphasize
“no single central leader or commander; the network as a whole…has little to no hierarchy,’
simultaneously being ‘both acephalous (headless) and polycephalous (hydra-headed).”111 An
example of this horizontal cell network is al-Qaeda, post the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan,
which leveled out into cells that operated semi-autonomously under the general mandates of
Osama bin Laden and his affiliates. These horizontal cells can be assembled quickly and
dissolved after even a single operation, such as the terrorist cell that carried out the London 2005
bombings.112
Furthermore, contemporary terrorist organizations have generally expanded the scope of
their targets. Rather self-explanatory, a terrorist’s target is its intended victim. Targets can range
from specific classifications (such as the group’s specific political opponent), to non-specific, all-
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inclusive generalizations (race, gender, religion). Specific targets are generally characteristic of
traditional terrorism, while non-specific, general terrorist targets are unique to today’s terrorism.

“While old terrorists went to great lengths to justify and legitimate attacks against people
who were not members of the security apparatus or in some other way associated with
the enemy government….new terrorist clearly have no hesitation in making whole
populations legitimate targets based on their ethnicity, religious affiliation, or the
policies carried out by their governments.”113

In fact, contemporary terrorist targets are generally motivated by a need to generate
media attention. Hence, their targets are less characterized by military or political utility, but
rather by the symbolic value of the target itself. Contemporary terrorist organizations seek to
direct violence against targets, such as civilians, that will guarantee them a large media
audience.114 In this way, contemporary terrorist targets are much less specific and more much
indiscriminate.
On that note, contemporary terrorist organizations have grown increasingly more brutal
in their methods of terror. Terrorist organizations’ methodology is the manner in which they
persecute their victims. Traditional terrorist methodologies are characterized by a few, principle
tactics; including assassination, bombing, kidnapping and hijacking. “Terrorists blow up things,
kill people, or seize hostages. Every terrorist incident is merely a variation on these three
activities,” said Brian Jenkins, Director of the National Transportation Security Center.
However, contemporary terrorist methodology is characterized by a rise in international
operations, mass-casualties, and interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction.115 “Terrorism
has become bloodier, in terms of what acts are committed and how many victims are involved”,
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summarizes Jenkins. Jenkins emphasizes that traditional terrorists were less concerned with the
body count, and more concerned with who was watching. This traditional mentality was
promoted through moral and practical constraints. Traditional terrorists had a principled sense of
self-image, and they generally avoided provoking international backlash. With the development
of contemporary terrorism, these constraints have lessened in importance and indiscriminate,
international violence has become the norm.116
Lastly, the operational cost of contemporary terrorism has grown significantly in
comparison to traditional terrorism. The increase in operational cost can be related to each of the
previously mentioned characteristics: organizational structure, terrorist targets, and methods of
terror. For the purpose of this research investigation, this study proposes the following definition
of operational cost: the financial cost of planning and carrying out terrorist operations and
objectives, in terms of funding flexibility, men, and strategic intelligence.
Firstly, the horizontal, cell network organization of contemporary terrorist organizations
requires funding fluidity. Since the contemporary terrorist is often cell-based, they require
financing that is easily transferable, easily available, and highly profitable, regardless of his
location. The contemporary terrorist organization needs financing venues that are both flexible
and profitable enough to fund operations globally. The higher the financial flexibility needed, the
more globally profitable the financial source must be. Hence, organizational structure influences
the kind of financial flexibility needed.
Secondly, the varied and indiscriminate targets of the contemporary terrorist organization
require high numbers of men (or women) willing to contribute to the organization’s methods of
terror. Since the contemporary terrorist organization has global targets, they have increasingly
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recruited men and women globally to act as foreign “cells” or affiliates. Furthermore, terrorist
organizations often use financial incentive to recruit members, and then require financing to train
and supply these recruits. The contemporary terrorist needs significant financing in order to
maintain the level of recruitment necessary to accomplish their global objectives, as well as in
order to pay and supply their members. The wider the parameters of the terrorist organization’s
targets, the more men needed to accomplish the terrorist organizations objectives. Hence,
terrorist targets influence the financial cost of men.
Lastly, the methods of terror used by contemporary terrorist organizations require
extensive tactical intelligence. Since the contemporary terrorist methodology is characterized by
mass-casualties, garnering international attention and acquiring advanced weapon technologies,
the contemporary terrorist is significantly dependent on their intelligence capabilities. Tactical
intelligence, as defined by the Department of Defense, is: “intelligence required for the planning
and conduct of tactical operations”. Complex methods of terrors, such as successfully carrying
out an international act of terror, require significant tactical intelligence. The intelligence
necessary for tactical intelligence can be defined as “the product resulting from the collection,
processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information
concerning foreign nations…or areas of actual or potential operations.”117 This necessary
intelligence collection, analysis, etc. generally requires significant financing. Hence, a terrorist
organization’s methods of terror influence the financial cost of intelligence.
According to this research study, the financial fluidity, cost of men and cost of
intelligence of a terrorist organization influences their operational cost. With the increased
operational cost of contemporary terrorist organizations in mind, the research study concludes
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that the contemporary terrorist organization must financially savvy and stable in order to attain
their objectives of terror. While there are numerous financing sources available to the
contemporary terrorist, this research study proposes that the narcotic industry will reappear as a
significant financial source to contemporary terrorism. The following section will emphasize the
reasoning behind the study’s prognosis of contemporary narcoterrorism.
The Future of Narcoterrorism
The theory of prospective contemporary narcoterrorism proposed by this research study
is jointly founded on the conclusions that 1) contemporary terrorism has a higher operational cost
and that 2) the narcotic industry offers several unique advantages to terrorist organizations.
First of all, the amorphous, horizontal organization of contemporary terrorist
organizations is similar to the organization of drug cartels and organized crime groups. The
similarity of their structures is highly conducive to cooperation and collaboration.118 The
horizontal nature of the narcotic industry is also conducive to the financial flexibility that
contemporary terrorist organizations seek. The narcotic industry offers terrorists diverse areas of
financing: drug production, drug transportation, drug distribution, etc. This diversity allows
terrorist organizations to diffuse their financial risk across the multiple facets of narco-financing.
Additionally, terrorist organizations benefit from the narcotic industry’s “off the book” approach,
since counter-terrorism and law enforcement efforts are less likely to detect concrete financial
footprints.119
Furthermore, the narcotic industry holds a wealth of opportunity for contemporary
terrorist organizations because of the resources possible through mutual cooperation. The
revenue of the narcotic industry is appealing to terrorists, whereas a terrorist group’s protective
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services or weaponry can seriously benefit an illegal narcotic operation. Both groups have strong
interests in the illegal arms and drug market; hence increased operations between the two groups
can facilitate their access to such illegal goods. In addition to the palpable resources possible
through cooperation, there are significant intangible benefits to mutual networking. Narcotic
organizations have extensive knowledge and expertise in illegal transportation. Drug routes are
capable of transporting other illegal goods and even people. This can be immeasurably useful to
terrorists, as they position or supply operatives internationally. On the other hand, narcotic
organizations can benefit from terrorists knowledge of foreign military strategies and weaponry.
For example, Pablo Escobar, a world-renowned drug lord, hired the National Liberation Army, a
Colombian terrorist organization, to build car bombs because the Escobar cartel did not know
how. Furthermore, both organizations significantly rely on personal connections, safe houses and
infiltration into various infrastructures. Collaboration between the organizations allows them to
increase their number of available resources.120
Last but not least, as the narcotic industry opens the door to new territories for terrorist
organizations. As previously mentioned, the contemporary narcotic industry is expanding their
consumer business into developing countries and opening new markets. A strong relationship
between contemporary terrorist organizations and the narcotic industry would offer terrorist
organizations new safe areas and easy developed strongholds. Terrorist organizations are able to
grow and avoid detect and/or competition much more easily in less developed areas that typically
suffer from political and socio-economic instability.
Some critics have argued that the narcotic industry is less appealing to terrorist
organizations than other forms of crime because it is a competitive industry.121 However, this
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research study disagrees with this for several reasons. First of all, the narcotic industry is
expanding its consumer market to less developed countries, which offers a lower level of
competition than developed countries. Secondly, the narcotic industry offers terrorist
organizations financial flexibility, “off the books” discretion, transportation and intelligence that
other criminal activities do not (i.e. white collar crime, burglary etc.)
Other critics have said that because drug lords (narcos) and drug cartels are not politically
motivated, they will have little interest in enabling terrorists. They argue that “narcos” are
essentially capitalists who have little to no interest in over throwing the status quo of capitalist
society.122 However, if narcos are motivated solely by money, then they are even more likely to
be interested in a cooperative relationship with contemporary terrorist organizations. The
narcotic industry would benefit significantly from mutual cooperation, in terms of intelligence,
training, protection, and supplies that would only improve their markets.
Overall, the future of narcoterrorism looks bright for contemporary terrorist organizations
and the narcotic industry, but dim for the audience and victims of both. The advantages that each
organization can offer one another in today’s world is not something to be overlooked. To put
into context the increasing prospect of contemporary narcoterrorism, the research study will
outline the background, characteristics and finances of a contemporary terrorist organization.
This specific terrorist organization has been at the forefront of contemporary terrorism and a
growing international security threat.
The Islamic State
The Islamic State loosely grew from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Al-Qa’ida Organization
for Holy War in Iraq (AQI) around 2004. However, the desire to spread out transnationally and
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the brutal methodology of the IS broke the group’s tie to Al-Qa’ida.123 Upon separation, the
group named themselves the “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI). In 2013, when ISI began to gain
international recognition for their strongholds in the northern territories of Iraq, they renamed
themselves the “Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) -another variation of this name is
the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL). For the sake of brevity, the terms “IS” and
“Islamic State” will be used throughout this case study. The Islamic State’s fanatical
interpretation of Islamic faith, its brutal methods of terror and its global objectives and targets
quickly caught international attention.124. The U.S. Department of State officially designated IS
as a foreign terrorist organization in 2004.125

Characteristics
The organizational structure, targets and methods of IS set it apart from other terrorist
organizations as the ideal poster child of contemporary terrorism. While IS central maintains
some traditional, hierarchal authority structures, the many affiliates and operative cells of IS
execute their communication and collaboration horizontally. The Islamic State’s greater
emphasis on horizontal structures, in comparison with traditional organizations that were strictly
vertical, allows IS to combine the advantages of vertical authority figures with the flexibility of
horizontally organized operatives.126
Secondly, IS targets are non-specific and indiscriminate. Their political targets include,
the Turkish government and the Iranian government, and their religious targets include secular
Muslims, Shiites, and any Islamists opposed to the Islamic State ideology.127 Their regional
targets include Christians, Shia Shabaks, Shia Turkmen, and Yazidis.128 However, IS targets are
not strictly regional. IS has expanded its operations transnationally and established operating
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units in Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia.129 IS has especially targeted
“Westerners” and western culture, by both persecuting those who support western ideologies
regionally and infiltrating the Western societies abroad.130 IS also encourages international
recruitment, asking “volunteers” to wage jihad in their own respective home countries.131
Lastly, IS has been characterized by brutal methods of asymmetrical warfare. Their
common regional methodologies include public beheadings, massacres, crucifixions, and
mutilations.132 The Islamic State’s tactics have been categorized as more military than insurgent
due to their complex level of training and techniques. U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
said of IS: “They’re beyond just a terrorist group. They marry ideology, a sophistication of
strategic and tactical military prowess.”133 Additionally, the Islamic State is highly armed with
advanced weaponry, unlike traditional terrorists. Through its warfare, IS has commandeered
tanks, drones, anti-aircraft, rocket launders, helicopters, cargo planes, etc. Of most concern, is
the Islamic State’s attempt to build and acquire biological weapons. Biological weapons are
relatively inexpensive, with extreme psychological and physical consequences on its victims.
The United Nations is especially concerned with IS efforts to obtain undeclared chemical
weapons in Syria from Syria’s chemical weapon stockpile.134
Internationally, IS has taken responsibility for a number of high-casualty attacks,
including “on 26 June in Sousse, on 10 October in Ankara, on 31 October over the Sinaï
Peninsula, on 12 November in Beirut and on 13 November in Paris,” to name just a few.135

Finances
The contemporary Islamic State is supported through extremely successful and pragmatic
financing. In 2015, it was determined that the Islamic State’s daily revenue was at about $1
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million per day, making it the richest terrorist group globally. However, contrary to popular
assumption, there has been no confirmed evidence that the Islamic State’s primary funds come
from foreign, wealthy donors. In fact, IS financial records have shown that the terrorist group is
extremely self-sustaining. The organization emphasizes financial sources from the illegal
economy such as extortion, burglary, and war plunder.136 The Financial Action Task Force, an
international agency focusing on countering terrorist financing, has released detailed reports on
IS finances. “IS is essentially living off the capital illicitly generated by the territory it occupies,
primarily by looting banks, exploiting oilfields and robbing economic assets.”137 In decreasing
order of financial contribution, IS funding is composed of 1) illegal capital from occupation,
such as oil, 2) kidnapping for ransom, 3) donations, 4) supplies from other terrorist
organizations, 5) international fundraising through media networks.138
While IS has been a highly successful fund-raiser, the organization also has notably high
expenses. In addition to weaponry and other military supplies, the organization pays salaries to
its members, based on family size, and continues to do so even if the active member is killed.
Additionally, it covers medical expenses and maintains active safe houses internationally. The
Islamic State is a cash-based organization, hence, it falls prey to internal corruption as well.139
Other financial factors to consider are the cost of recruitment, training, transportation,
intelligence, etc.
However, recently the Islamic State has come under financial pressure. Due to coalition
airstrikes, low economy in both Iraq and Syria, and low oil prices, the terrorist organization’s
finances have been much tighter than usual. Airstrikes have been conducted against both IS oil
fields and banks. Airstrikes have reduced the Islamic State’s oil revenue by an estimated 30%
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and destroyed at minimum tens of millions of IS’s treasury. These recent financial shortcomings
could lead IS to seek other financing sources, such as the narcotic industry. Hanif Atmar, the
Afghan national Security advisor, stated that the Islamic State is interested in narcotic operations
in Afghanistan and opening their access to the drug trade.140
When such a financially successful terrorist empire such as the Islamic State begins to
show signs of financial stress, it is only prudent to analyze where the organization might turn to
financially. Joint analysis of the advantages of a mutual cooperation between the narcotic
industry and terrorist organizations and the contemporary characteristics of the Islamic State
support the argument of a prospective rise in contemporary narcoterrorism.

Conclusions
This case study offered a comparative analysis of the contemporary narcotic industry, the
characteristics of contemporary terrorism and the mutually beneficial advantages of
narcoterrorism. The case study underlined the characteristics of the Islamic State, one of the most
relevant contemporary terrorist organizations today: horizontal organizational structures,
international and indiscriminant targets, high tactical intelligence methods and a high operational
cost. Then, the case study emphasized the financial restrictions that have recently constricted the
Islamic State. The purpose of this case study was to illustrate the potential expansion of IS into
new sources of revenue and to present the argument that the narcotic industry could be easily be
the Islamic State’s new financial partner.
The final conclusion of this research study will recapitulate the comparison between
traditional narco-terrorist relationships and a potential, contemporary narco-terrorist relationship.
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Additionally, the conclusion will emphasize why this research is important and further areas of
research related to this topic.

55

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
Narcoterrorism is no longer a term that marks headlines and leads U.S. national security
agendas. Rather, it is a neglected area of security studies and the issues of narcotics and terrorism
are considered to be separate issues. President George Bush’s “War on Drugs” campaign was the
last notable U.S. counter-narcoterrorism agenda. Bush’s Presidential Address on National Drug
Policy broadcasted on C-Span in 1989 illustrates a level of counter-narcotics and counternarcoterrorism that no longer characterizes U.S. security policies.141
First of all, the “War on Drugs” within the U.S. seems to be a failed war. Several states
have legalized marijuana for medical use, others have legalized marijuana in the same
parameters of alcohol, and numerous states have relaxed their drug sentencing laws. “With
Congress rolling back punitive drug policies…it is doubtful another president will hold a special
address to talk about escalating the war on drugs. If anything it’s probably only a matter of time
before a president uses an address to make the case for…ending the war on drugs,” said Ethan
Nadelmann, executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance.142 Another indicator of the failed
drug war in the U.S. is the high level of clemency that President Obama has granted to drug
offenders throughout his presidential terms.143
With the evolution of contemporary terrorism and the relevance of terrorism in today’s
security policies, it is time again to reconsider the potential financing role of the drug trade. With
the increased complexity of contemporary terrorist organizations, in terms of organizational
structure, terrorist targets, and methods of terror, the operational cost of contemporary terrorism
has concomitantly increased.
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Consequently, there is an immediate and strategic counter-terrorism need to reevaluate
possible sources of contemporary terrorist financing. The research predicts that development
within the aforementioned characteristics of terrorist organizations will cause a significant shift
in contemporary financial sources. Although there are numerous sources that contribute to
terrorist organizations financially and politically, this research study has focused on the narcotic
industry due to its steady and growing presence globally.
Perhaps one of the most resilient and constant global markets, the international narcotic
industry has a wealth of benefits to offer contemporary terrorist organizations. These benefits
include a stable source of income, strong knowledge of international transportation/smuggling
routes, a mutually advantageous relationship in terms of supplies and intelligence. The incentive
of these benefits is a serious cause for concern in terms of global security.
Contemporary terrorist organizations have developed beyond the traditional violent,
political groups into sophisticated movements enduring longer than any one organization. The
characteristics of terrorism have significantly evolved. Contemporary terrorists now operate
globally, opening their access to new economic and political resources or opportunities. This
“globalization” of terrorist organizations has enhanced the multi-dimensional qualities of the
organizations, as contemporary terrorists increasingly operate in collaboration. It can be argued
that the new face of terrorism is not one single terrorist organization, but numerous affiliates
cooperating and coordinating as a movement.
The aforementioned case studies presented multi-dimensional research. Firstly, they
established historic examples of roles that the narcotic industry has played (and will continue to
play) in financing terrorism. They have illustrated the differences between traditional and
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contemporary organizations, specifically within the factors of organizational structure, terrorist
targets, and methods of terror. The analysis of these factors suggests that contemporary terrorist
organizations have grown increasingly more complex. This increased complexity also increases
the operational cost of- and consequently the level of financing needed to support- contemporary
terrorist organizations.
The mass causality attacks within the 1990-2000s-1993 World Trade Center, 1995 Tokyo
subway, 1995 Oklahoma City, 2001 World Trade Center, 2002 Bali- signaled to the world a
“new” and brutal terrorism. However, the development of contemporary terrorism is not only
within its characteristics of organization, targets and methodology, but also in its financing.
Traditional terrorism was mostly state sponsored, however, the general corruption and state
failures of developing areas (where terrorism most commonly originates) encouraged terrorist
organizations to seek their own funding. This lead to the financial diversification of the
contemporary terrorist organization: the contemporary terrorist pursued a financial model of both
“licit and illicit enterprises.” Additionally, the financial liberty of contemporary terrorism, in
comparison to traditional state sponsored or popular support terrorism that operated within the
political limits of their sponsor, explains how “ ‘new terrorist’ organizations such as al Qaeda
and a wide variety of other self-sufficient groups find themselves increasingly able to operate
free from such constraints.”144
Contemporary terrorist organizations have developed even further than the terrorist
organizations at the turn of the century. The increase of contemporary terrorist movements, such
as the Islamic State, illustrates a sort of “political” consolidation between contemporary terrorist
organizations. This research study believes that this shift towards political consolidation will also
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develop a shift towards financial consolidation. While the financial diversification of
contemporary terrorism was well suited for the extremist terrorist organizations breaking away
from their state sponsors in the 1990s, the operational costs of contemporary terrorist
organizations/movements will eventually encourage a more consolidated financial model.
Since contemporary terrorist organizations need a higher level of financing, it seems
prudent to conclude that they will seek out the most profitable and advantageous financial
sources to consolidate. Due to the illicit nature of terrorism, contemporary terrorist organizations
would be best served by a likewise illegal enterprise that can offer the following: stable financial
revenue, international market connections/transportation routes/intelligence capabilities, a covert
financial market, a flexible market and a market easily introduced/expanded into the terrorist
organizations regional strongholds.
The research focuses on the financial and strategic resources of the narcotic industry,
which satisfies all of the advantages previously listed. Consequently, this study argues that in
comparison to the narcoterrorism of traditional terrorists, contemporary terrorists hold the
potential to significantly capitalize on the multitude of resources that the narcotic industry offers.
Conclusion Table
To visually summarize the comparison of differences between traditional and
contemporary terrorist organizations as portrayed through the three case studies, the following
table, Table 5.1: Case Study Comparison, presents the organizational structure, terrorist targets,
methods of terror and operational cost of the terrorist organizations outlined in the previous
chapters. The characteristics will then be recapitulated in detail with a quick summary of each
respective case study.
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Table 1: Case Study Comparison of Terrorist Organizations' Characteristics

Characteristics

Organizational
Structure

Terrorist Targets

(Influences financial

(Influences cost of men)

fluidity)
Case Studies

Las Auto
Defensas Unidas
de Colombia
(AUC)

Methods of Terror

Operational Cost

(Influences cost of
intelligence)

(Financial fluidity, cost of men, cost of
intelligence)

Characteristics’ Level of Complexity
Basic -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Complex

Vertical chain of
command

Specific, “legitimate”

Kidnappings, extortion,
political assassinations

Lower financial fluidity, lower cost of
men, lower cost of intelligence

Vertical chain of
command

Specific, “legitimate”

Hijackings, suicide
bombings

Lower financial fluidity, lower cost of
men, lower cost of intelligence

Horizontal
relationships,
vertical chain of
command playing
smaller role

Non-specific, varied,
“indiscriminate”

International
operations, interest in
advanced weapon
technologies

Higher financial fluidity, higher cost of
men, higher cost of intelligence

-Traditional-

The Taliban
-Traditional-

The Islamic State
of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS)
-Contemporary-
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The AUC: The Latin American’s Traditional Narcoterrorist
The first case study on Colombia’s Auto Defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) illustrates
the characteristics of a traditional organization significantly involved with the narcotic industry.
The AUC was directed and organized under the leadership of Carlos Castaño. His
direction transformed the AUC from various, uncoordinated paramilitary units into a formal,
vertically structured organization. This style of leadership is representative of traditional terrorist
organizations, which often mimicked the hierarchal structures of conventional military groups.
As the ultimate authority of the organization, he directed their operations and financial activities,
including the AUC’s high involvement in Colombia’s cocaine industry.145
Secondly, the AUC illustrates the traditional definition of targets. Traditional targets are
specifically delineated as direct political competition, and are generally within the geographical
boundaries of the respective organization. Additionally, the targets can be considered
“legitimate”, meaning that those targets hold a legitimate threat to the organization. The AUC’s
targets were specific to Colombia’s left-wing guerrilla groups and their alleged sympathizers that
challenged the right-wing authority of the state. The AUC was able to legitimize their targets as a
threat to the stability of their political infrastructures.146
Next, the methods that traditional terrorist organizations employ also have their distinct
differences. Traditional terrorist organizations employ methods that are simpler, meaning they
require a low amount of manpower, munitions, and intelligence. The AUC used traditional
methods, such as torture, kidnappings, extortions, and assassinations, which require low
manpower, munitions and intelligence.147

The consolidation of these characteristics made the AUC’s operational cost relatively
lower in terms of financial cost, cost of men and cost of intelligence. Furthermore, the AUC,
which was significantly associated with and funded by Colombia’s highly successful cocaine
industry, used narco-terrorism to sustain the longevity of the paramilitary’s presence and
political power in Colombia.
The Taliban: Afghanistan’s Traditional Narcoterrorist
The second case study on Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and insurgency reinforces the
characteristic definitions of traditional terrorist organizations and illustrates a strong similarity to
the AUC’s narcoterrorist relationship model.
The Taliban regime fell under the vertical authority of Mullah Mohammad Omar. Omar
strictly centralized the organization of the Taliban through vertical structures. As Supreme
Leader, Omar and an elite group of elders directed the objectives and activities of Taliban regime
and the post-regime Taliban insurgency. Like Castaño, Omar was directly in charge of the
Taliban’s finances, and he too encouraged the group’s involvement in Afghanistan’s opium
market.148
The Taliban’s targets were also specific to direct threats against their political/religious
principles. Their targets lay inside Afghanistan’s borders, as they attempted to gain and maintain
control of Afghanistan. Additionally, the methods of the Taliban were relatively uncomplicated.
Their methods of choice, including suicide bombing and hijacking, can be considered less
complex because these methods require lower levels of manpower, munitions, or intelligence
than other, more complex methods.149
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Finally, the operational costs of a traditional terrorist organization, such as the Taliban,
are lower in terms of financial cost, cost of men, and cost of intelligence. The Taliban’s
association with Afghanistan’s opium industry significantly bolstered and sustained the
organizations power as both a regime and an insurgency.
ISIL: The Islamic State
On the other hand, the final case study on the Islamic State illustrates the unique qualities
of contemporary terrorist organizations. Although IS maintains some vertical organizational
structures, the organization has emphasized and encouraged the growth of “cells” and their
horizontal organization. This contemporary shift towards the emphasis of horizontal structures
has allowed the Islamic State to acquire numerous affiliates and infiltrate international borders.
This horizontal structures require extensive collaboration between cells and the distribution of
financial resources becomes much more complex. Hence, “cells” must be able to garner their
financing through direct, personal relationships rather than rely on the funding that central ISIL
leaders are able to send their way.150
Contrastingly to traditional targets, contemporary IS targets are non-specific and
indiscriminate, condemning numerous religious, ethnic, and political classifications that do not
conform to their principles. Additionally, their targets are not strictly regional. Instead, they have
expanded their targets internationally and encouraged recruitment to establish global affiliates
that enforce the Islamic State’s objectives in their own respective regions.151
IS methods of operation, on the other hand, are much more complex as they conduct
operations abroad, seek high casualties, and have a vested interest in acquiring advanced
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weaponry. The complex methods of contemporary organizations require significant manpower,
supplies and intelligence collaboration to plan and execute operations.152
Contrastingly to the first two case studies, the Islamic State’s operational cost is
significantly higher, due to a higher financial cost, higher cost of men, and a higher cost of
intelligence associated with accomplishing their objectives. The following section will
reemphasize how terrorist organization’s characteristics influence their operational cost, as well
as underline the mutual advantages of narco-terrorist relationship.
Main Findings
Based on the analysis of the case studies, the most prudent conclusion to answering our
research questions is that contemporary terrorist organizations are significantly more complex in
comparison to other traditional terrorist organizations and thus require a higher level of
financing. Furthermore, due to the success of narcoterrorism by traditional terrorist
organizations, it seems prudent to conclude that contemporary terrorist organizations with higher
operational costs have a potentially stronger relationship with the narcotic industry. In order to
summarize the analysis that supports the previous conclusion, the following section will offer a
brief capitulation of how characteristics –organizational structure, terrorist targets, methods of
terror- influence operational cost and why the narcotic industry is an ideal choice for terrorist
organizations.
First of all, horizontally structured terrorist organizations require significantly more
funding fluidity than traditional vertically structured organizations. This research study’s
definition of funding fluidity is a financial market that is easily transferable, easily available, and
highly profitable, regardless of location. Horizontal terrorist organizations or “cells” are spread
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out strategically and require financial fluidity that coincides with their organizational structure.
The higher the need for financial fluidity, the higher need for a profitable financial source that
can accommodate their operational costs. Hence, due to the horizontal organization of
contemporary organizations, which require high levels of financial fluidity, their operational
costs are higher in comparison to traditional terrorist organizations.
Secondly, the indiscriminate targets of contemporary terrorist organizations require a
higher number of men (and women) willing to contribute to the cause, which in turn requires an
extensive focus on recruitment globally. The wider the parameters of a terrorist organization’s
targets, the more individuals needed to accomplish the terrorist organization’s objectives. The
financing needed to motivate, employ, train and supply recruits internationally is significant.
Hence, contemporary terrorist organizations have a higher cost of men, which contributes to their
overall higher cost of operations.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the methods of terror used by contemporary
terrorists require extensively more tactical intelligence than traditional methods of terror.
Contemporary terrorist methodology is characterized by causing mass-causalities, catching
international attention, and acquiring advanced weapon technologies, all of which is significantly
dependent on the intelligence capability of the terrorist organization. The intelligence necessary
to accomplish contemporary goals is extensive and expensive. Hence, methodology influences
the cost of intelligence and contributes to a contemporary terrorist organization’s high overall
operational cost.
Overall, the combination of high financial fluidity, high cost of men and high cost of
intelligence, respectively related to organizational structure, terrorist targets and methods of
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terror, result in a high operational cost for contemporary organizations. Out of several financial
options in the contemporary world, the narcotic industry offers several unique advantages to
contemporary organizations. First of all, the horizontal organization of the narcotic industry is
conducive to cooperation between the industry and terrorist organizations. Also, the narcotic
industry offers diverse areas of financing related to narcotics including: production,
transportation, distribution, etc. The “off the book” tactics, horizontal structures, and diverse
markets of the narcotic industry significantly contribute to a high level of financial fluidity
appealing to contemporary terrorists. Additionally, mutual cooperation can offer transportation
routes, intelligence and international connections that are extremely useful for their global
operations.
In conclusion, the research study proposes that the relationship between terrorist
organizations and the narcotic industry is far from over, and may be in fact only just beginning.
The research study prudently concludes from the supporting evidence that the development
within terrorism-from traditional to contemporary- has amplified the prospective contemporary
relationship between the terrorist organizations and the global narcotic industry.
Future Research
At the beginning of this study, the posed research questions were, “How have terrorist
organizations evolved? And how will the differences in their characteristics affect the strength of
their relationship with the narcotic industry?” Now that this study has answered these research
questions, there are other related questions to investigate that would further contribute to the
literature of this research study.
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The overall purpose of this research study was to raise awareness of the ever-present
narcotic industry and its growing potential in the context of contemporary terrorism. In a world
where the threat of terrorism has globalized, the financing sources of terrorist organizations are
not to be underestimated or disregarded. On that note, the development of this research study
would benefit from adding two variables to the comparative analysis of the case studies: sources
of revenue and political scope. First of all, sources of revenue would be useful in illustrating the
financial resources of terrorist organizations and their preferred methods of financing. Sources of
revenue to especially look into include: terrorist taxing, and human trafficking. Secondly,
political scope would be another useful variable in defining the difference between traditional
and terrorist organizations, meaning the level of political power/legitimacy that the terrorist
organization seeks. Traditional terrorist organizations tend to have a smaller, more
geographically defined political scope, whereas contemporary terrorist organizations have gone
global in their search for political legitimacy. Based off this “global” characteristic of
contemporary terrorism, the argument could also be added that another benefit of collaborating
with the contemporary narcotic industry would be greater access to land, both regionally and
internationally. The contemporary narcotic industry is significantly tired to their physical,
geographical location, hence, any relationship with a contemporary terrorist organization would
give the terrorist organization greater access and personal connections to acquiring territories.
Contemporary terrorist organizations are especially interested in international territories to
support their search for “global” legitimacy. Throughout the future development of this research
study, both of these variables, sources of revenue and political scope, will most likely be added
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to incorporate an important, functional dimension to the research. However, at this time, due to
current resources and time constraints, the research study was unable to include these variables.
Additionally, this study advocates that further research and analysis be made into today’s
narco-terrorist relations in order to preemptively discuss counter-narcotic strategies and the
consequences of a stronger relationship between contemporary terrorist organizations and the
narcotic industry. One suggested area for future research would be to compare the global
counter-narcotic policies that are currently in place in areas of high drug trafficking. This
comparative analysis would allow for investigation into the successes and weaknesses of these
policies, specifically in the context of narco-terrorism. This analysis could be tailored to specific
regions and/or to specific narcotic substances. Another alternate area of future research would be
to compare drug trafficking routes to the communication and transportation routes of terrorist
organizations. Analysis into the overlap between terrorist and narcotic “traffic” would give a
better visual of which terrorist organizations and which narcotic substances are more likely to
contribute to a narcoterrorist relationship.

68

REFERENCES
1

Davids, Douglas J. 2002. “Narcoterrorism: a unified strategy to fight a growing terrorist menace”
Transnational Publishers. Pp. 3-5

2

Clarke, Colin P. The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare (Santa Barbara:
Preager Security International, 2015). Pp. 1-26.

3

Ridley, Nick. The Failure of Counter Measures (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,
2012). Pp. 2.

4

Ehrenfeld, Rachael. "Funding Terrorism: sources and methods." In Workshop held at Los Alamos
National Laboratory March, vol. 25, no. 29, p. 391. 2002, Pp. 393.

5

Björnehed, Emma. "Narco-terrorism: the merger of the war on drugs and the war on terror." Global
Crime 6, no. 3-4 (2004). Pp. 306.

6

Neumann, Peter R. Old and New Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 15-29.

7

Curtis, Glen E., Rex A. Hudson, and Nina A. Kollars, "A global overview of narcotics-funded terrorist
and other extremist groups" (Library of Congress, 2002), 2

8

Menjívar, Cecilia and Néstor Rodríguez, When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies
of Terror (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005). Pp. 237

9

Macdonald, David. Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and Scorpion Tales (London: Pluto Press,
2007). Pp. 1-65.

69

10

Clarke, Colin P. The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare (Santa Barbara:
Preager Security International, 2015). Pp.

11

Ridley, Nick. The Failure of Counter Measures (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,
2012). Pp. 2

12

Gurule, Jimmy. Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2008). Pp.

13

Menjívar, Cecilia and Néstor Rodríguez, When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies
of Terror (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005). Pp. 237.

14

Colin P. Clarke, The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare (Santa Barbara:
Preager Security International, 2015). Pp. 113-118.

15

Clawson, Patrick, and Rensselaer W. Lee. 1998. The Andean cocaine industry. n.p.: New York : St.
Martin's Press, 1998. Pp. 3, 178

16

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Guns, drugs, and
development in Colombia. Austin: University of Texas Press. Pp. 3-4.

17

Adams, James. 1986. The financing of terror: behind the PLO, IRA, Red Brigades, and M-19 stand
the paymasters: how the groups that are terrorizing the world get the money to do it. New York:
Simon and Schuster. Pp. 215.

18

Allen, Christian Michael. 2005. An industrial geography of cocaine. New York: Routledge. Pp. 35.

70

19

20

Ibid, 36-41.
Villar, Oliver, and Drew Cottle. 2011. Cocaine, death squads, and the war on terror: U.S. imperialism
and class struggle in Colombia. New York: Monthly Review Press. Pp. 66-67.

21

Thoumi, Francisco E. "Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis." The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582 (2002): 102-16.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1049737. Pp. 103-114

22

Allen, Christian Michael. 2005. Pp. 39-70.

23

Davids, Douglas J. 2002. Narco-terrorism: a unified strategy to fight a growing terrorist menace.
Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers. Pp. 25.

24

Mac Gregor, Felipe E. 1993. Coca and cocaine: an Andean perspective. Westport, Conn: Greenwood
Press. Pp. 59

25

Thoumi, Francisco E. 2002. Pp. 103-114.

26

Villar, Oliver, and Drew Cottle. 2011. Pp. 29.

27

Mac Gregor, Felipe E. 1993. Pp. 46.

28

Adams, James. 1986. Pp. 226.

29

Mazzei, Julie, Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? How paramilitary groups emerge and challenge
democracy in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). Pp. 4-6.

71

30

Henderson, James D. 2015. Colombia's narcotics nightmare: how the drug trade destroyed peace.
Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Pp. 121.

31

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Pp. 58-59.

32

Hristov, Jasmin. 2014. Paramilitarism and neoliberalism: violent systems of capital accumulation in
Colombia and beyond. Pp. 93.

33

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Pp. 58-59.

34

Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Pp. 99-125.

35

Giraldo, Javier. 1996. Colombia: the genocidal democracy. Monroe, Me: Common Courage Press. Pp.
60.

36

37

Giraldo, Javier in Hristov, Jasmin. 2014. Pp. 58-59.
Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Pp. 60.

38

Hristov, Jasmin. 2014. Pp. 95-96.

39

Davids, Douglas J. 2002. Pp. 27.

40

Hristov, Jasmin. 2014. Pp. 102-103.

41

Villar, Oliver, and Drew Cottle. 2011. Pp. 127.

42

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Pp. 59

72

43

Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Pp. 93.

44

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Pp. 60.

45

Menjívar, Cecilia and Néstor Rodríguez, When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies
of Terror (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 245.

46

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Pp. 61.

47

Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Pp. 120-125.

48

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Pp. 136-138.

49

Henderson, James D. 2015. Pp. 145.

50

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. Pp. 162.

51

Henderson, James D. 2015. Pp. 145.

52

Kirk, Robin. 2005. "The Lessons of Mapiripán: A response to Lesley Gill.” Transforming
Anthropology 13, no. 2: 116. Publisher Provided Full Text Searching File, EBSCOhost
(accessed January 29, 2017).

53

Orozco, Cecilia (2002) in Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M.
Curtin. 2008. Pp. 62.

54

Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Pp. 108-109.

73

55

Menjívar, Cecilia and Néstor Rodríguez. 2005. Pp. 237.

56

Henderson, James D. 2015. Pp. 151.

57

Adams, James. 1986. Pp. 218.

58

2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs. https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol1/253252.htm

59

Kreutzmann, Hermann. “Afghanistan and the Opium World Market: Poppy Production and Trade”
Iranian Studies 40 (2007). Pp. 604-605.

60

Rotberg, Robert I. 2007. Building a new Afghanistan. Cambridge, Mass: World Peace Foundation. Pp.
178-179.

61

Mansfield, David. 2016. A state built on sand: how opium undermined Afghanistan. Oxford,
University Press. Pp. 102-103.

62

Rotberg, Robert I. 2007. Pp. 183.

63

Mansfield, David. 2016. Pp. 103.

64

Macdonald, Dave. 2007. Drugs in Afghanistan: opium, outlaws and scorpion tales. London: Pluto.
Pp. 60-62.

65

66

Goodhand, J. (2012) in Mansfield, David. 2016. Pp. 103.
Ward, Christopher and William Byrd (2004) in Rotberg, Robert I. 2007. Pp. 182

74

67

Adapted from Peter Reuter in, Freeman, Michael. 2012. Financing terrorism: case studies. Farnham:
Ashgate. Pp. 101-102.

68

Rotberg, Robert I. 2007. Pp. 186.

69

Ibid. Pp. 183.

70

Mansfield, David. 2016. Pp. 105.

71

Macdonald, Dave. 2007. Pp. 62-63.

72

Kreutzmann, Hermann. 2007. Pp. 607-616.

73

Cornell, Svante E. "Stemming the Contagion: Regional Efforts to Curb Afghan Heroin's Impact."
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6, no. 1 (2005): 23-31.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43134070. Pp. 24-30.

74

Rotberg, Robert I. 2007. Pp. 185-186.

75

Shayer, Joanna. "Hard Habit to Break." The World Today 64, no. 4 (2008): 6-9.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40478168. Pp. 7-9.

76

Freeman, Michael. 2012. Financing terrorism: case studies. Farnham: Ashgate. Pp. 110.

77

Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2007. Terrorism financing and state responses: a
comparative perspective. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Pp. 95.

78

Freeman, Michael. 2012. Financing terrorism: case studies. Farnham: Ashgate. Pp. 110.
75

79

Martin, Gus. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues (Los Angeles: Sage
Publications, 2016). Pp. 241.

80

Freeman, Michael. 2012. Pp. 93-94.

81

Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2007. Pp. 95.

82

Ryan, James. 2009. "Taliban." Taliban 1. Middle Search Plus, EBSCOhost (accessed January 15,
2017).
https://login.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?auth=shibb&url=http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.net.
ucf.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mih&AN=18006147&site=eds-live&scope=site

83

Ibid.

84

Freeman, Michael. 2012. Pp. 94.

85

Ryan, James. 2009.

86

Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2007. Pp. 104.

87

Ryan, James. 2009.

88

Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2007. Pp. 113.

89

Clarke, Colin P. The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare (Santa Barbara:
Preager Security International, 2015). Pp. 113-118.

90

Mansfield, David. 2016. Pp. 107.
76

91

Clarke, Colin P. 2015. Pp. 113-118.

92

Mansfield, David. 2016. Pp. 123.

93

Clarke, Colin P. 2015. Pp. 113-118.

94

Muhammad Tahir (2008) in, Freeman, Michael. 2012. Pp. 101.

95

Freeman, Michael. 2012. Pp. 100.

96

Clarke, Colin P. 2015. Pp. 120-123.

97

Ibid.

98

“Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Cultivation and Production.” United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime.
https://www.unodc.org/documents/press/releases/AfghanistanOpiumSurvey2016.pdf

99

Meierrieks, Daniele & Friedrich Schneider (2016): The short- and long-run

relationship between the illicit drug business and terrorism, Applied Economics Letters, DOI:
10.1080/13504851.2016.1150942. Pp. 1.
100

Davids, Douglas J. 2002. “Narcoterrorism: a unified strategy to fight a growing terrorist menace”
Transnational Publishers. Pp. xiv.

101

UNDOC, World Drug Report 2012 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.12.XI.1)

77

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2012/WDR_2012_web_small.pdf Pp.
iii.
102

UNINCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2015, (United Nations publication,
Sales No. E.16.XI.1).
https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2015/English/AR_2015_E.pdf
Pp. 43.

103

USDEA, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary 2015, (USDEA publication, DEA-DCT-DIR008-16) https://www.dea.gov/docs/2015%20NDTA%20Report.pdf Pp. iii

104

UNINCB. 2015. Pp. 21.

105

UNDOC. 2012. Pp. 5.

106

USDEA. 2015. Pp. 83-84.

107

UNDOC. 2012. Pp. 14-15.

108

Ibid. Pp. 5-6.

109

UNINCB. 2015. Pp. 1-2.

110

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02
(Washington, DC: DOD, 2016), p. 241.

111

Neumann, Peter R. Old and New Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). Pp. 17-19.

78

112

Mockaitis, Thomas R. 2007. The "new" terrorism: myths and reality. Westport, Conn: Praeger
Security International. Pp. 11.

113

Neumann, Peter R. 2009. Pp. 27.

114

“The Terrorist Attack Cycle: Selecting the Target.” 2005. Stratfor.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/terrorist-attack-cycle-selecting-target

115

Neumann, Peter R. 2009. Pp. 27-28.

116

Jenkins, Brian Michael. The New Age of Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1215.html. Pp. 118.

117

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02
(Washington, DC: DOD, 2016), p. 114.

118

Björnehed, Emma. (2004) Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs

and the War on Terror, Global Crime, 6:3-4, 305-324, DOI: 10.1080/17440570500273440. Pp. 309.
119

Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2007. Terrorism financing and state responses: a
comparative perspective. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Pp. 41.

120

Björnehed, Emma. 2004. Pp. 310-311.

121

Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2007. Pp. 42.

79

122

Collett, Merrill. 1988. "The myth of the 'narcoguerrillas'." Nation 247, 113. Readers' Guide Full Text
Mega (H.W. Wilson), EBSCOhost (accessed February 18, 2017).

123

Martin, Gus. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues (Los Angeles: Sage
Publications, 2016). Pp. 155.

124

Alexander, Yonah, and Dean C. Alexander. 2015. The Islamic State: combating the caliphate without
borders. (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015). Pp. xvii-3.

125

US Department of State. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

126

Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State.
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1

127

Alexander, Yonah, and Dean C. Alexander. 2015. Pp. 56.

128

Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities,” Human Rights Watch, July 19, 2014, accessed
March 27, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/19/iraq-isis-abducting-killing-expellingminorities

129

Laub, Zachary and Masters, Jonathan. “The Islamic State.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 22,
2016, accessed March 27, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811

130

Alexander, Yonah, and Dean C. Alexander. 2015. Pp. 57.

131

Martin, Gus. 2016. Pp. 156.
80

132

“Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,”
United Nations General Assembly, August 13, 2014, accessed March 27, 2016,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.27.60_Eng.pdf

133

Alexander, Yonah, and Dean C. Alexander. 2015. Pp. 51.

134

Ibid. Pp. 56.

135

“Security Council ‘Unequivocally Condemns ISIL Terrorist Attacks, Unanimously Adopting Text
that Determines Extremist Group Poses ‘Unprecedented’ Threat,” United Nations Security
Council, November 20, 2015, accessed March 27, 2016,
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12132.doc.htm

136

Johnston, Patrick B. and Bahney, Benjamin. 2014. “Hit the Islamic State’s Pocketbook.” The Rand
Blog. http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/10/hit-the-islamic-states-pocketbook.html

137

Bell, Stewart. “Crackdown on countries failing to freeze assets; Terror financing.” National Post,
February 27, 2015.

138

Alexander, Yonah, and Dean C. Alexander. 2015. Pp. 62.

139

Shatz, Howard J. 2014. “To Defeat the Islamic State, Follow the Money.” The Rand Blog.
http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/09/to-defeat-the-islamic-state-follow-the-money.html

140

“Isis wants access to Afghanistan’s opium and drugs, says Atmar.” Khaama Press. May 5, 2015.

81

141

“Presidential Address on National Drug Policy.” September 5, 1989. C-Span. https://www.cspan.org/video/?8921-1/presidential-address-national-drug-policy

142

“Friday: 25th Anniversary President George H.W. Bush Infamous Oval Office Speech Escalating
“War on Drugs.” September 04, 2014. Drug Policy.
http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2014/09/friday-25th-anniversary-president-george-hw-bushsinfamous-oval-office-speech-escalatin

143

Criss, Doug. 2016. “Thanks, but no thanks: Inmate rejects Obama’s clemency offer.” CNN.
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/17/health/clemency-rejectiontrnd/index.html?sr=fbcnni101816clemency-rejection-trnd1030AMStoryLink&linkId=30060254

144

Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2007. Terrorism financing and state responses: a
comparative perspective. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Pp. 95. Pp. 7-8.

145

Mazzei, Julie, Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? How paramilitary groups emerge and
challenge democracy in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
Pp. 93.

146

Hristov, Jasmin. 2014. Paramilitarism and neoliberalism: violent systems of capital accumulation in
Colombia and beyond. Pp. 95-96.

147

Ibid.

82

148

Ryan, James. 2009. "Taliban." Taliban 1. Middle Search Plus, EBSCOhost (accessed January 15,
2017).

149

Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas. 2007. Pp. 113.

150

Neumann, Peter R. Old and New Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). Pp. 17-19.

151

“The Terrorist Attack Cycle: Selecting the Target.” 2005. Stratfor.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/terrorist-attack-cycle-selecting-target

152

Neumann, Peter R. 2009. Pp. 27-28.

83

